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INTRODUCTION 
Many employees regularly face significant difficulty balancing their 
work and family responsibilities.  In a recent national survey, thirty percent 
of adults stated that they had experienced some work-family conflict during 
the course of the previous week.1  The difficulty Americans encounter 
balancing work and family is not surprising since the vast majority of 
working Americans are often responsible for providing care to their 
children, elderly parents, or disabled family members.2 
In recent years, both scholars and the media have focused considerable 
attention on the work-family conflict in general, and specifically, on the 
failure of the American workplace to adequately accommodate the needs of 
working parents.3  Scholars have recognized that the long hours Americans 
                                                          
 1. See JODY HEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP:  WHY AMERICA’S WORKING FAMILIES 
ARE IN JEOPARDY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 164 (2000). 
 2. See id. (noting that the need to care for family members is prevalent among 
Americans regardless of factors such as race, gender, education, or income level). 
 3. E.g., ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT:  WORKING PARENTS AND THE 
REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989) [hereinafter HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT]; ARLIE 
RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND:  WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES 
WORK (1997) [hereinafter HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND]; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING 
GENDER:  WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000) 
[hereinafter WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER]; Rachel Arnow-Richman Accommodation 
Subverted:  The Future of Work/Family Initiatives in a “Me Inc.” World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN 
& L. 345 (2003); Martha Chamallas, Mothers and Disparate Treatment:  The Ghost of 
Martin Marietta, 44 VILL. L. REV. 337 (1999); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family:  
Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 431 (1990); Laura T. Kessler, The 
Attachment Gap:  Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the 
Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (2001); Peggie 
R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-Family Conflict:  
Lessons from Religious Accommodation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443; Joan Williams & Nancy 
Segal, Beyond The Maternal Wall:  Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated 
Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77 (2003) [hereinafter Williams & Segal, 
Maternal Wall]; Joan Williams, Canaries in the Mine:  Work/Family Conflict and the Law, 
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2221 (2002) [hereinafter Williams, Canaries]; Stephanie Armour, 
Some Moms Quit as Offices Scrap Family-Friendliness, USA TODAY, May 4, 2004, at A1, 
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work combined with the inflexibility of the American workplace cause 
significant difficulty for working parents.4  All too often parents who need 
time off from work to care for their children may risk losing their jobs. 
Two federal statutes, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)5 and 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VII),6 address the needs of 
working parents to some extent.  However, both of these statutes have 
failed to provide meaningful accommodation for the majority of working 
parents.7  The FMLA does not provide leave for routine childcare 
obligations, but rather only permits a parent to take unpaid leave for the 
birth or adoption of a child,8 or to care for a child who has a serious 
illness.9  The FMLA is further limited by the fact that it does not cover the 
majority of American employees.10 
Title VII, an antidiscrimination statute, is limited by its focus on formal 
equality, which essentially requires that employers treat similarly situated 
employees in a similar manner11 and courts interpreting Title VII are 
generally reluctant to require differential treatment.12  Furthermore, as an 
                                                          
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2004-05-03-working-moms_ 
x.htm; Lisa Belkin, Q:  Why Don’t More Women Get to the Top?, A:  They Chose Not To:  
Abandoning the Climb and Heading Home, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, at 42; Lynn 
Crawford Cook, A Time to Come Home, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at HE01.  While the 
author recognizes that there are family obligations other than parental responsibilities that 
should also be accommodated in the workplace, such as caring for an ill parent, spouse, or 
other relative, this Article focuses specifically on the issue of parental accommodation in the 
workplace. 
 4. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that jobs now require longer hours, 
including nighttime and weekend hours); Smith, supra note 3, at 1452-54 (describing how 
parents have resorted to a number of make-shift solutions, such as dual-income earners 
working opposite shifts in an attempt at adapting to the problems of balancing work with 
childcare responsibilities). 
 5. 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (2000). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). 
 7. See infra Part III (detailing the inadequacies of the FMLA and Title VII with 
respect to addressing the work-family conflict). 
 8. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1)(A)-(B) (allowing twelve weeks of unpaid leave during 
the course of a year for birth or adoption). 
 9. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). 
 10. The FMLA only covers employers with fifty or more employees and only covers 
employees who have worked at least 1,250 hours during the preceding year.  29 U.S.C. § 
2611(4)(A)(i).  As a result, only about one-half of the American workforce is eligible for 
leave under the FMLA.  Nancy E. Dowd, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993:  Ten 
Years of Experience:  Race, Gender, and Work/Family Policy, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
219, 238 n.84 (2004) (explaining that while two-thirds of employees work for covered 
employers, only one-half are eligible to take leave due to the requirements regarding hours 
worked and time on the job).  Workers with higher income and educational levels tend to 
meet eligibility requirements more often than those with lower income and educational 
levels.  Id.   
 11. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 438-39 (presenting a feminist critique that, due to its 
adherence to formal equality, Title VII fails to notice real differences, such as women’s 
disproportionate role in caregiving). 
 12. See Karen Engel, The Persistence of Neutrality:  The Failure of the Religious 
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 320 (1997) (stating  
that courts have been adverse to approve affirmative action because it requires differential 
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antidiscrimination statute, Title VII does not recognize or address the needs 
of parents or children.  Therefore, neither the FMLA nor Title VII provides 
leave for the numerous routine childcare obligations for which parents are 
most likely to need time off from work.  These obligations may include 
caring for a child with a common childhood illness such as a cold or the 
flu, attending appointments with teachers and principals or dealing with 
school closings, and last-minute babysitter cancellations. 
One potential model for addressing the needs of working parents which 
has attracted little scholarly attention is section 701(j) of Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act,13 which mandates religious accommodation in the 
workplace.14  Specifically, section 701(j) uses a balancing approach and 
states that an employer must “reasonably accommodate” an employee’s 
religious needs in the workplace when such accommodation can be made 
without “undue hardship” to the business of the employer.15 
Section 701(j) of Title VII is an appropriate model to address the issue of 
parental accommodation in the workplace because it explicitly recognizes 
that formal equality failed to adequately protect religious employees who at 
times needed affirmative accommodation of their religious beliefs and 
practices.16  Similarly, formal equality has failed to protect working parents 
who, in many cases, need flexible work policies to balance their work and 
parenting responsibilities.17 
The balancing approach of section 701(j) is also appropriate because it 
recognizes the needs of both the employer and the employee and mandates 
accommodation only in cases where the employer will not suffer undue 
hardship.18  While there will clearly be instances where accommodation of 
                                                          
treatment of employees); see, e.g., Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 
1567 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that Title VII prohibits an employer  from instituting a non-
remedial affirmative action program that uses race as the deciding factor in an effort to 
promote diversity). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). 
 14. The author is aware of only one article that has seriously analyzed how § 701(j) 
could be used as a model to develop legislation mandating parental accommodation in the 
workplace.  See generally Smith, supra note 3.  Professor Smith’s article focuses in large 
part on developing a definition of “compelling parental obligation” based on the 
unemployment compensation case law as well as on developing an alternative definition of 
“undue hardship.”  See id. at 1467-73, 1479-86. 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
 16. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1460 (arguing that reasonable accommodation laws, 
such as § 701(j), respond to the fact that in certain situations the imposition of formal 
equality will actually lead to discriminatory treatment); see also Steven D. Jamar, 
Accommodating Religion at Work:  A Principled Approach to Title VII and Religious 
Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 742 (1996)  (recognizing § 701(j) as “the first legal 
recognition that religion-based cases needed to be treated differently from other cases”). 
 17. See infra Part III.B (discussing how Title VII has failed to adequately protect 
working parents); see also Smith, supra note 3, at 1456 (suggesting that Title VII cannot 
currently remedy the work-family conflict since it is based on a formal equality model). 
 18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (“The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious 
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable 
to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious 
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working parents may be difficult or costly for employers,19 there are also 
numerous situations where working parents can be accommodated in the 
workplace with minimal or no cost to employers.  For example, economic 
studies indicate that accommodation of working parents may actually save 
employers money in the long run when one considers the costs associated 
with high employee turnover rates, absenteeism, and lost productivity.20  
This Article examines how to best develop a statute mandating parental 
accommodation in the workplace based on section 701(j) and considers the 
potential problems associated with this approach. 
Part I of this Article addresses the demographic changes, which have 
caused the work-family conflict to be a significant problem in the United 
States.  Part II discusses the harm caused when employers fail to 
accommodate working parents, specifically addressing the harm to women, 
men, children, society, and employers.  In doing so, Part II illustrates why 
lack of accommodation is a serious problem that needs to be addressed.  
Part III discusses the failure of federal legislation—specifically the FMLA 
and Title VII—to adequately forbid discrimination against and mandate 
accommodation of working parents.  Part IV examines how to best develop 
an accommodation model based upon section 701(j) of Title VII.  This 
Part, which is the primary focus of the Article, provides an in-depth 
analysis of the issues raised by the section 701(j) case law and discusses 
how these issues would likely present themselves in the context of parental 
accommodation. 
I. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT 
The difficulty faced by working parents in balancing their work and 
family responsibilities has been caused in large part by the failure of the 
American workplace to keep pace with the changing demographics of 
American society.  The majority of families today are no longer traditional 
patriarchal families with a full-time stay-at-home mother and a father who 
works out of the house.  Rather, most employees are either part of a dual-
earner family (where both spouses work) or the head of a single parent 
family.  In the last few decades there has been a huge increase in the 
number of women who have entered the workplace.21 Between 1969 and 
                                                          
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”); 
see also infra Parts IV.B-C (analyzing how the balancing approach of § 701(j) should be 
applied in cases of parental accommodation). 
 19. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the appropriateness of § 701(j) as a model and 
providing examples of instances where employers may face undue hardship in granting 
leave to employees with work-family conflicts). 
 20. See Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 88-89.  
 21. For additional discussion on how women entered the workforce see HEYMANN, 
supra note 1, at 2-6 (discussing the labor revolution from home and agriculture-based work 
to a paid industrial labor force that now includes women). 
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1998, participation in the labor force by married women nearly doubled, 
and participation by married women with children under the age of three 
increased nearly threefold.22  By 2000, sixty-four percent of married 
couples with children under the age of eighteen had both parents working 
outside the home,23 and in 2002, seventy-two percent of mothers with 
children age one and older were in the labor force.24 
Yet despite these demographic changes, today’s workplace remains 
structured around the “ideal worker”25—an employee who has no childcare 
responsibilities, is able to “work at least forty hours a week year round,” 
and work overtime on short notice.26  This “ideal worker” norm is based on 
the traditional life patterns of men,27 i.e., a traditional patriarchal family 
with a working father and full-time stay-at-home wife to care for their 
children.  One legal commentator explains that “[m]arket work continues to 
be framed around the assumption that ideal workers have access to a flow 
of family work that few mothers enjoy.”28 
In addition to these demographic changes, over the last few decades the 
number of hours that American employees work has increased while the 
number of vacation days and other days that employees take off has 
decreased.29  Furthermore, studies indicate that American employees now 
work longer hours than employees in most other industrialized nations.30  
Americans work longer hours than Europeans, with American men 
working an average of forty-five hours a week and American woman 
                                                          
 22. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 374 (attributing the increase in women’s employment 
in part to Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes). 
 23. Smith, supra note 3, at 1448. 
 24. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, Percentage of Childless Women 40-44 
Years Old Increases Since 1976, Census Bureau Reports (Oct. 23, 2003), at 
http:/www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/fertility/001491.html (on file 
with the American University Law Review).  In recent years, the labor force participation 
rate of mothers with children under the age of one has slightly decreased.  From 1998 to 
2002, this rate declined from fifty-nine percent to fifty-five percent.  Id.  Workplace experts 
attribute this decrease, in part, to inflexible work schedules, which cause some working 
mothers of infants to quit their jobs.  See Armour, supra note 3. 
 25. Cf. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 2. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Cf. id. at 2 (arguing that the focus on the male life pattern negatively affects women 
of childbearing age). 
 28. Id. at 3. 
 29. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 6-7 (observing that, while 
more working mothers were entering the workforce, working fathers were adding more 
hours as well, leading them to work nearly as much as childless men).  But see Jerry A. 
Jacobs & Kathleen Gerson, Toward a Family-Friendly, Gender Equitable Work Week, 1 U. 
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 457, 458-60 (1998) (arguing that the number of hours worked by the 
average American employee has not increased, but rather, the percentage of employees 
working either long or short weeks has increased and the number of hours worked by the 
average American couple has increased as well). 
 30. See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1956-57 (2000) (arguing 
that the United States government should consider enacting legislation that would reduce the 
standard full-time work week for all employees).   
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working approximately forty hours a week.31  Moreover, the overtime 
hours worked by American employees are now higher than those worked in 
Japan.32 
The failure of the American workplace to keep pace with the changing 
demographics of the country, coupled with the long hours worked by many 
American employees, has led to significant difficulties for working parents 
attempting to juggle their jobs and childcare responsibilities.33  It is 
therefore not surprising that the majority of Americans supports change, 
and specifically supports government policies that would help working 
parents.34  For example, ninety percent of parents favor tax-incentives to 
encourage employers to adopt family-friendly policies.35  Clearly, the 
struggle to balance family and work is an issue that greatly matters to many 
Americans. 
The conflict between work and family is not unique to the United States 
and exists in other industrialized nations as well.36  What is unique to the 
United States is the government’s failure to meaningfully address this 
issue.37  Over the last few decades, the United States has relied almost 
exclusively on businesses voluntarily addressing the work-family conflict.38  
Unfortunately this experiment has not succeeded, and the failure of the 
American workplace to meaningfully accommodate working parents has 
caused harm to individuals, employers, and society. 
                                                          
 31. Id. at 1957.  A number of European nations have reduced the standard workweek, 
and commentators have suggested that the standard American workweek should be 
shortened as well.  See, e.g., Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 29, at 468 (advocating for a 
thirty-five hour work week in response to the fact that most workers today are either heads 
of single parent households or are members of a dual earner family); Schultz, supra note 30, 
at 1957-58 (noting legislation in various European countries that sets mandatory limits on 
the length of the workweek and providing examples of emerging attempts to do the same by 
state governments, unions, and employers in the United States).  But see Mark Landler, 
Europe Reluctantly Deciding It Has Less Time for Time Off, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2004, at A1 
(describing that Europeans are also now working longer hours than they have in the past). 
 32. Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity:  Care as Work, 
Gender as Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1490 (2001) [hereinafter Williams, 
Difference]. 
 33. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (arguing that the U.S. workplace, for the 
most part, has failed to provide flexible schedules to working parents). 
 34. HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 164 (noting that such support is widespread among 
Republicans, Democrats, and Independents). 
 35. See id. (discussing that seventy-nine percent of parents think that employees should 
be able to request time off instead of overtime pay and seventy-one percent would like to 
see workers receive up to two weeks of unpaid leave per year in addition to vacation time). 
 36. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 30, at 1957 (recognizing the efforts of France and 
Germany to shorten the work week). 
 37. See, e.g., Paolo Wright-Carozza, Organic Goods:  Legal Understandings of Work, 
Parenthood and Gender Equality in Comparative Perspective, 81 CAL. L. REV. 531, 532-33 
(1993) (suggesting that American employment law, in contrast to the law of most European 
nations, neglects to consider social relationships and responsibilities, and  the needs of 
children). 
 38. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 167 (“We are the only industrialized country 
to engage in an experiment that is almost entirely private-sector based.”). 
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II. HARM CAUSED BY THE WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT 
This Part discusses the harm caused by inflexible workplace policies and 
the lack of meaningful accommodation of working parents.  Specifically, 
this Part addresses the ways in which the lack of meaningful workplace 
accommodation negatively affects women, children, men, society, and even 
employers.  In doing so, this Part illustrates the significance of the problem, 
and consequently why parental accommodation in the workplace is 
necessary.  This Part also responds to arguments made by critics 
questioning whether, and the extent to which, society should have an 
obligation to accommodate working parents.39 
A. Harm to Women 
Inflexible workplace policies are a significant problem for both men and 
women with childcare responsibilities.  However, lack of accommodation 
is particularly problematic for mothers, since mothers are much more likely 
than fathers to have primary responsibility for raising their children.  The 
need to balance work and family is an issue for the majority of women 
since almost ninety percent of working women do become mothers.40 
Many mothers make significant career sacrifices to take on their 
childcare responsibilities.  Specifically, women perform about eighty 
percent of the childcare for their families and, as a result, over ninety 
percent of mothers cannot do the type of overtime required by the best 
jobs.41  This is a serious problem because the workplace remains structured 
around “ideal workers” who can work long hours on short notice.42  While 
there are many reasons as to why women have primary childcare 
responsibilities, the workplace environment perpetuates the role of a 
woman as the primary caregiver because companies are significantly more 
                                                          
 39. See ELINOR BURKETT, THE BABY BOOM:  HOW FAMILY-FRIENDLY AMERICA CHEATS 
THE CHILDLESS 7-11, 18-22 (2000) (contending that America’s obsession with granting 
perks to working parents has created a situation of wealth re-distribution from childless 
workers, including those with few resources, to working parents, even if they are wealthy); 
Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes:  An Essay on Feminism, Law and Desire, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 181-85 (2001) (arguing that feminist legal theorists focus on the importance 
of motherhood to the point where they ignore women’s identity beyond their role as 
mothers).  
 40. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 2.  Books such as The Baby 
Boon criticize women’s rights groups for focusing on issues affecting working mothers 
since not all women are mothers.  See BURKETT, supra note 39, at 7-8 (arguing that “family 
friendly” legislation has ignored the thirteen million childless adults over forty in America).  
While it is certainly true that not all women are mothers, the vast majority of women are 
mothers and issues affecting working mothers are therefore important for the majority of 
women. 
 41. See Williams, Difference, supra note 32, at 1471. 
 42. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (describing the “ideal worker” as  
based on the traditional life patterns of men).   
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likely to provide maternity leave than paternity leave.43 
Additionally, motherhood has a strong negative effect on a woman’s 
income.44  Despite the fact that the pay differential between men and 
women has decreased, the salary gap for mothers has increased.45 Studies 
indicate that this pay gap is strongly associated with differing family 
responsibilities and is not due to differences in education or work 
experience.46  When adjustments for education are taken into consideration, 
the gender-based earning gap between mothers and fathers is larger than 
the earnings gap between blacks and whites.47  In addition, the workplace 
remains very segregated by gender, and women are underrepresented in 
jobs with higher pay and status.48 
Mothers are also disadvantaged by stereotypes regarding working 
mothers, and their careers are likely to be harmed when they hit the 
“maternal wall,”49 which generally occurs when a woman gets pregnant, 
becomes a mother, or asks for a flexible or part time work schedule.  
Studies indicate that once one of these three events occurs, a woman is 
more likely be viewed as a “low-competence caregiver rather than as a 
high-competence business woman.”50  The problems associated with the 
maternal wall are compounded by the fact that women in the workplace are 
often disadvantaged to begin with as a result of the “glass ceiling.”51 
                                                          
 43. See, e.g., Angie K. Young, Assessing the Family and Medical Leave Act in Terms of 
Gender Equality, Work/Family Balance, and the Needs of Children, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
113, 116-17 (1998) (offering the results of surveys which show that although fifty-two 
percent of employers provided maternity leave, only thirty-seven percent provided paternity 
leave). 
 44. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 2 (noting how full-time 
working mothers earn sixty cents to the dollar earned by full-time working fathers); see also 
Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths:  Independence, Autonomy, 
and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 15-16 (2000) (“[O]ne of the 
most compelling problems facing society at the end of the Twentieth Century [is] the 
increasing inequitable and unequal distribution of societal resources and the corresponding 
poverty of women and children.”). 
 45. See Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
25, 33 (1998) (comparing 1978 statistics showing that women with children earned 62.5% 
as much as men while women without kids earned 68.4% with 1994 statistics indicating that 
mothers earned 73.4% as much as men while childless women earned 81.3%). 
 46. See HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 148. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Cf. id. at 149 (offering, for example, the fact that women hold a disproportionately 
low share of high paying university teaching positions, yet account for seventy-six percent 
of primary and secondary teachers who make far less).   
 49. See Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 77 (offering anecdotal 
statements from women whose employers have limited their work responsibilities either due 
to their plans to take maternity leave or after their return from maternity leave and 
referencing studies which indicate that motherhood has played an increasing role in the 
gender pay disparity). 
 50. Id. at 90. 
 51. See generally Christine Jolls, Is There a Glass Ceiling?, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 
(2002) (asserting that unlawful sex discrimination still occurs, and partly accounts for 
women’s diminished status in the labor market); Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra 
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The barriers that working mothers face have become institutionalized to 
the point that they simply seem to be part of the definition of work and do 
not appear to be what they are—artificial barriers.52  It is accepted that the 
“ideal worker” is an employee who can work long hours, work overtime 
with little notice, and does not need unexpected leave.53  Employers 
generally accept the importance of “face time,” regardless of whether it 
correlates to higher quality work.54  The privileges that non-mothers enjoy 
in the workplace are simply taken for granted.55  However, there is often no 
business justification for the way the workplace is structured today, and a 
business argument can be made for accommodating working parents.56 
It should be noted that there are numerous reasons why women work 
and, consequently, the problem of balancing work and parenting 
obligations is not going to disappear.  Many women must work to support 
their families because of decreases in real wages, increases in single parent 
families, and unprecedented divorce rates.57  Like many men, many women 
also get a sense of accomplishment and personal satisfaction from their 
employment.58  Studies indicate that women who work for pay have better 
physical and mental health.59  Paid employment is also crucial for mothers 
because the only way for women to achieve true economic equality is by 
increasing their access to private wealth, and this usually occurs through 
meaningful employment opportunities.60  Legal commentators have focused 
                                                          
note 3, at 98-101 (concluding that mothers are particularly disadvantaged in the workplace 
due to the interaction between the “maternal wall” and glass ceiling biases, such as “in-
group favoritism, status-linked assessment stereotypes, attributional bias, polarized 
evaluations, and penalties for being too competent in traditionally masculine jobs”). 
 52. See Mary Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1495, 
1527-28 (2001) (contending that jobs can be re-structured so as to accommodate working 
parents and suggesting that the parenting burden should also be shared by men). 
 53. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (describing the “ideal worker” which 
is based on the traditional life patterns of men). 
 54. See infra notes 102, 109 and accompanying text. 
 55. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 52, at 1528 (listing a number of privileges that workers 
without children take for granted, including greater respect at work, more sleep at night, and 
not having to  worry about their children during the day).  There is also, at times, a 
generational conflict between younger and older women.  See Williams, Canaries, supra 
note 3, at 2228 (describing the situation in law firms where women of the baby boom 
generation often resolved the work-family conflict by not having children or by having 
children and continuing to work long inflexible hours). 
 56. See infra Part II.E (arguing that inflexible work conditions lead to higher attrition 
and turn-over rates, and that employers may therefore harm themselves by refusing to 
accommodate working parents).   
 57. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 383 (stating that one-third of all homes with children 
under eighteen are single parent households and noting that most single mothers have to 
work full-time jobs in order to stay out of poverty). 
 58. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 41 (discussing how 
working women are generally not as depressed and have higher self-esteem than women 
who do not work). 
 59. See id.; see also Schultz, supra note 30, at 1908-11 (describing how working 
women generally benefit from filling multiple roles). 
 60. See Williams, Difference, supra note 32, at 1457 (“To achieve economic equality 
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on the importance of paid work as the foundation of a stable democratic 
order.61  It should be noted that some critics argue that the work-family 
conflict faced by many working women is simply a matter of choice and 
the flaws with this reasoning will be addressed in Part IV.62 
B. Harm to Children 
In addressing the need for parental accommodation in the workplace, it 
is important to recognize the needs of children63 and these needs, 
unfortunately, are often ignored.64  While there are two federal statutes—
the FMLA and Title VII—which offer some protection to working 
parents,65 neither of these statutes adequately recognizes that workplace 
accommodation is important to protect the rights of children. 
Lack of parental accommodation in the workplace is connected to the 
issue of childhood poverty.  Because the financial security of children is 
often connected with their mother’s financial situation, and inflexible work 
conditions combined with child care responsibilities economically impair 
women, children end up suffering economically as well.66  This problem is 
particularly acute in households headed by single mothers.  Because of a 
divorce rate of approximately fifty percent and a high rate of out-of-
wedlock births, approximately one-third of all children under eighteen are 
raised in a single-parent household.67  Moreover, the majority of these 
                                                          
for women, we need to change not only women’s relationship to public wealth, we need to 
change their relationship to private wealth as well.  After all, most of the world’s assets are 
held by private parties—men—who gain it through employment and the family economy.”).  
In order to illustrate that greater access to public wealth may not create gender equality, 
Professor Williams discusses how Sweden actually exhibits a more sexually segregated 
economy than the United States despite its outstanding social subsidies for care work.  Id.; 
see also Malin, supra note 45, at 32 (explaining how the generosity of Sweden’s parental 
leave policy has actually created a highly sexually segregated workforce since employers 
now prefer to hire young men because they are less likely to take parental leave). 
 61. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 30, at 1928-30 (asserting that paid employment brings 
together people of diverse groups, allows co-workers to develop respect for one another, 
provides people with opportunities to set and reach goals, and gives people a chance to 
contribute to something greater than themselves). 
 62. See infra Part IV.B.4.  
 63. See Young, supra note 43, at 132 (recommending that “parental-leave polic[ies]” be 
structured “from a family or child perspective, rather than from an adult perspective” so as 
to “provide support to ensure that children’s caretakers have structures within which to 
nurture their families”). 
 64. Cf. Wright-Carozza, supra note 37, at 574-78 (discussing how Italian laws 
protecting working parents, unlike U.S. laws, explicitly recognize the importance of 
children). 
 65. See infra Part III (highlighting the protections and limitations of the FMLA and 
Title VII). 
 66. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 44, at 20 (“There are forgone opportunity costs 
associated with care taking, and even caretakers who work in the paid labor force typically 
have more tenuous ties to the public spheres because they must also accommodate 
caregiving demands in private.”). 
 67. Kessler, supra note 3, at 383-84. 
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households are headed by women.68  Even children in two-parent 
households suffer economically when a parent leaves the workplace.69 
Children of working parents who are able to keep their jobs, despite their 
childcare responsibilities, also suffer as a result of the inflexible American 
workplace.  Parental involvement, for example, is one of the most 
important factors determining how a child performs in school.70  Because 
working parents are often unable to take time off from work to attend 
meetings with teachers, principals, and other school officials,71 or to stay at 
home with their children when they are sick,72 the needs of children are 
further undermined by the American work system.  Long parental 
workdays with inadequate time to care for children have also been linked to 
a number of serious childhood problems including psychiatric illness, drug 
use, and involvement in crime.73  These problems are even more pressing 
for poor children whose parents tend to have less flexibility in their work 
schedules and fewer resources available to help them with childcare.  
Furthermore, it is important for children to spend time with their fathers, as 
well as their mothers, because studies indicate that paternal involvement 
has a positive effect on every stage of childhood development.74 
Clearly, employers need employees who are reliable and able to perform 
their jobs, and there will be times that working parents will be unable to 
spend as much time with their children as they would like.  However, 
federal law today is tipped almost fully in favor of the employer and does 
not adequately protect the needs of children or even recognize the 
importance of workplace accommodation to children. 
C. Harm to Men 
While the majority of employees requesting accommodation of their 
                                                          
 68. See id. at 384 n.51 (revealing that the poverty rate for female headed households is 
higher than that of two-parent households). 
 69. See id. at 383 (noting that in many two-parent households both parents must work 
because real wages have decreased over the past few decades). 
 70. See HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 53 (explaining the correlation between parental 
involvement and a child’s understanding of language and mathematics as well as progress in 
other developmental areas). 
 71. See id. (revealing that many parents are not provided with sufficient paid leave to 
take time off work to address these problems). 
 72. See id. at 162.  
 73. See HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 10 (addressing studies that show 
a greater frequency of developmental problems in young people today compared with those 
of the previous generation).  Admittedly, the exact link between these problems and the 
amount of time parents spend with children is unclear.  Id.  Regardless, children want more 
time to spend with their parents, and parents want more time to spend with their children.  
Id. at 11. 
 74. See, e.g., Malin, supra note 45, at 28-31 (describing a study conducted by the U.S. 
Department of Education that shows a positive correlation between paternal involvement 
and academic performance). 
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parenting responsibilities are mothers, lack of accommodation in the 
workplace is also a serious problem for fathers who want to be involved in 
the lives of their children.75  Studies indicate that the stereotype that men 
get most of their satisfaction and self-worth from their careers and not from 
their families is inaccurate, and that many fathers want to better balance 
work and parenting responsibilities.76  In fact, fathers who are not actively 
involved with their children may end up paying an emotional cost.77  
Paternal involvement is also positively correlated with a child’s 
development and with a mother’s mental health and career success.78  
Moreover, fathers who participate in the “second shift” of home life tend to 
have happier marriages.79 
Fathers are less likely than mothers to ask for parental accommodation in 
the workplace, both for financial reasons and because of workplace 
hostility to such requests.  Parental leave is almost always unpaid, and in 
two-parent households where both spouses work outside the home, the 
father is usually the higher paid employee.80  It therefore makes economic 
sense for the mother to be the one to readjust her schedule.  A mother is 
also significantly more likely than a father to have paid leave to care for an 
infant.81 
While both mothers and fathers may encounter workplace hostility when 
asking for an accommodation of their parental responsibilities, the hostility 
faced by men is greater.  In one study, sixty-three percent of employers 
stated that it was unreasonable for a father to take any parental leave.82  
Fathers who ask for parental accommodation are viewed more negatively 
than mothers asking for similar accommodations.83  In fact, a father who 
asks for time off for his parenting responsibilities not only is considered a 
less serious employee but also is viewed as a less competent father since 
society tends to link being a good father with being a good provider.84 
                                                          
 75. See generally Malin, supra note 45 (analyzing the importance of paternal leave); 
Keith Cunningham, Note, Father Time:  Flexible Work Arrangements and the Law Firm’s 
Failure of the Family, 53 STAN. L. REV. 967 (2001) (discussing the impact of law firm 
policy and culture on employees who are fathers). 
 76. See Malin, supra note 45, at 33-36 (highlighting studies that showed a desire by 
both mothers and fathers to better balance their career and family responsibilities).   
 77. See HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT, supra note 3, at 262 (noting the desire of 
most contemporary working fathers to spend time with their families). 
 78. See Malin, supra note 45, at 28-33 (asserting that the lack of paternal involvement 
in childcare encumbers women’s success in the workplace). 
 79. See id. at 55 (recognizing the benefits received by mothers, children, and fathers 
when fathers are involved in childcare). 
 80. Id. at 37-38. 
 81. See Cunningham, supra note 75, at 976 (noting that, while fifty-three percent of 
surveyed companies offered paid maternity leave, only thirteen percent of the businesses 
offered any paid paternity leave). 
 82. Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 101-02. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. 
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D. Harm to Society 
Democratic theorists have long recognized a strong connection between 
the health of a democracy and how its children are raised because children 
are the future citizens of the democracy.85  All Americans, and not just a 
child’s parents, have a vested interest in ensuring that today’s children 
grow up to be productive and responsible adults.  Accommodating parents 
in the workplace so that working parents are able to better balance their 
work and parenting responsibilities is an effective way of addressing this 
issue.86 
Society as a whole benefits from the work of parents and others who 
raise children.  As economists assert, 
The time, money, and care that parents devote to the development of 
children’s capabilities create an important public good whose benefits 
are enjoyed by individuals and institutions who pay, at best, a small 
share of the cost.  Economists define a public good as one that is difficult 
to put a price on because it is nonexcludable (someone can enjoy it 
without paying for it) and nonrival (one person can enjoy it without 
diminishing someone else’s enjoyment of it.)87 
Today’s children will become the future taxpayers, teachers, doctors, 
lawyers, politicians and caregivers as well as future presidents of the 
United States.88  Society is only able to reproduce itself and continue to 
exist as a result of caregivers who are raising the next generation of 
citizens.89 
When parents do not have adequate time to spend with their children, it 
is not only their children, but also society as a whole, that is harmed.  For 
example, working parents often lack adequate time to be involved in their 
                                                          
 85. See, e.g., Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Who Should Pay for the Kids?, 563 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 194, 195 (1999) (describing how children are a public 
good). 
 86. See infra Part IV.A (examining how developing a statute mandating parental 
accommodation in the workplace based on § 701(j)’s requirement of religious 
accommodation in the workplace may provide more meaningful protection to working 
parents). 
 87. England & Folbre, supra note 85, at 195. 
 88. See Fineman, supra note 44, at 19 (“Caretaking labor provides the citizens, the 
workers, the voters, the consumers, the students, and others who populate society and its 
institutions.  The uncompensated labor of caretakers is an unrecognized subsidy, not only to 
the individuals who directly receive it, but more significantly, to the entire society.”). 
 89. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 
1410 (2001) (emphasizing the collective responsibility of caretaking because of its 
importance to society).  Professor Franke responds to what she refers to as the “we must 
reproduce the species” argument by suggesting that a change in immigration policies could 
provide all the workers our country needs.  Franke, supra note 39, at 193.  However, there 
are numerous reasons why parents have children, and a change in immigration policy 
certainly will not affect the very personal decision of whether to have children.  See Becker, 
supra note 52, at 1524, 1533-35 (criticizing Franke’s proposal and arguing that women will 
not decide whether to have children based on a shift in immigration policies). 
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children’s education, which harms children academically.90  This harm is 
problematic because the United States is failing to compete internationally 
in primary and secondary education, and studies indicate that the success of 
a country in the global economy depends in part on its citizens’ educational 
attainment.91 
Yet despite the importance of caring for children, and the fact that all of 
society benefits from this work, caregiving is undervalued in the United 
States, and the costs of raising children are paid primarily by their parents, 
which is unfair in today’s economy.92  A century ago, parents bore much of 
the cost of raising children but also received much of the economic benefit 
of their children who labored from a young age to help support the family 
and later supported their parents in old age.93  By contrast, when today’s 
children grow up they will be providing financial assistance to many 
families other than their own through taxes such as Social Security and 
Medicare.94 
In addition to benefiting from the caregiving work of those who raise 
children, society also suffers economically when parents are forced out of 
the workplace as a result of their childcare responsibilities.  For example, 
taxpayers as well as employers pay the cost in the form of unemployment 
compensation, welfare, and Supplemental Security Income.95  In addition, 
if parents cannot work outside the house, society will lose the taxes that 
would otherwise be paid on employment income. 
Critics respond to the position that raising children is important for 
society by arguing that parents do not necessarily have their children for 
society-sustaining purposes.  For example, in her recent book, The Baby 
Boom, Elinor Burkett approvingly quotes a critic who states, “Sure, all 
those folks became parents because they were sitting around one night, 
worrying about the future of the nation and decided, ‘we better go upstairs 
                                                          
 90. See HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 53 (describing the correlation between parental 
involvement in the education of children with academic achievement and lower dropout 
rates). 
 91. See id. at 184 (acknowledging the view of policymakers that the welfare of nations 
largely depends on the education of its citizens). 
 92. Cf. Fineman, supra note 89, at 1407. 
 93. See HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 170 (noting how children worked from an early age 
on farms and in homes to benefit their families). 
 94. See id. (explaining that while the benefits of having children are enjoyed by the 
public, the costs of caring for children are still shouldered by the parents); see also Becker, 
supra note 52, at 1531-32 (explaining that children benefit the whole country by becoming 
taxpayers and filling general service jobs). 
 95. Young, supra note 43, at 158.  Professor Malin has examined the extent to which 
unemployment insurance is available to employees who were forced out of employment as a 
result of childcare responsibilities and has determined that “[p]ublic and private workplace 
values are evolving to recognize that employees’ family obligations may curb employer 
autonomy in directing the workforce.”  Martin H. Malin, Unemployment Compensation in a 
Time of Increasing Work-Family Conflicts, 29 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 131, 174 (1996). 
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and do something about it.’”96  In a Columbia Law Review Essay, 
Professor Franke questions the validity of feminists in describing children 
as a “public good [since] children remain the private property of their 
parents, which is an arrangement most feminists do not find troubling.”97  
These types of arguments fail, however, because they confuse the issues of 
why people have children and how they raise their children with the fact 
that economically, these children are a public good.98 
Professor Franke also fails to recognize the extent to which society does 
have some control over the manner in which children are raised.  While it is 
true that there are fundamentally private aspects of childrearing which 
society does not want the government to be involved in, the government 
through child welfare laws regulates many aspects of childrearing.99  In 
fact, working parents may find themselves facing legal difficulties when 
they must leave their children unattended or with inadequate care in order 
to go to work to support their families.100  For many working parents, the 
choice is literally between physically being with their children and having 
money to feed and clothe their children. 
There is no question that the primary responsibility for raising children 
rests with parents, and that childrearing involves financial and personal 
sacrifices from parents.101  No legislation in the United States will change 
this fact and no person should have children unless he or she is willing to 
devote both time and money to raising them.  However, society as a whole 
                                                          
 96. BURKETT, supra note 39, at 196 (quoting Ilene Bilenky, a childfree-woman). 
 97. Franke, supra note 39, at 191.  In reaction to a group of parents home-schooling 
their children, she argues that “we have delegated to private parties the task of producing 
and raising the next generation, and we have done so in the absence of any public 
accountability.”  Id. at 192. 
 98. Becker, supra note 52, at 1533 (explaining why children are a public good). 
 99. See, e.g., Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (2004) 
(amending the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, the Adoption Opportunities Act, 
the Abandoned Infants Assistance Act, and the Family Violence Prevention and Services 
Act); Promoting Safe and Stable Families Amendments of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 629 (2002) 
(amending the Promoting Safe and Stable Families program and Foster Care Independent 
Living program).  Of course there are many problems with these laws, which are evidenced 
by cases of child abuse and the high rate of childhood poverty.  For example, in 2002, the 
rate of child abuse and neglect fatalities reported by the National Child Abuse and Neglect 
Data Systems (NCANDS) rose from 1.84 per 100,000 children in 2000 to 1.96.  National 
Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, Child Abuse and Neglect 
Fatalities:  Statistics and Interventions, at 
http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/factsheets/fatality.pdf (on file with the American University 
Law Review). 
 100. One commentator writes of a school social worker who left her children home alone 
for about ten minutes after school before she got home from work.  While left alone, the 
children started roughhousing and one was hurt and taken to the hospital.  When the doctor 
discovered the children had been left home alone he had the mother investigated.  
HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 46-47. 
 101. See id. at 166 (“Employed caregivers themselves can do a lot, and their involvement 
is critical; but they can play the role they need to only when they have the necessary 
working conditions and social supports.”). 
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both benefits from the caregiving work of those who raise children and is 
greatly affected by how those children are raised.  Therefore, society has an 
obligation to caregivers and an interest in ensuring that parents are 
accommodated in the workplace so that they are able to meet their 
parenting obligations. 
E. Harm to Employers 
Employers may also harm themselves by refusing to accommodate 
working parents.  For example, many employers measure worker quality by 
“face time” even when no clear correlation between hours at the job and 
productivity exists.102  This focus on “face time” discriminates against 
employees with childcare responsibilities and ignores the fact that 
employers may actually improve their bottom line when they accommodate 
working parents. 
Economic studies indicate that once long-term costs are taken into 
consideration, Flexible Work Arrangements (FWAs) may save employers 
money by decreasing costs associated with “attrition, absenteeism, 
recruiting, quality control, and productivity.”103  FWAs have been shown to 
be cost-effective when offered to high-level professional employees as well 
as to clerical staff and make business sense in both large and small 
corporations.104 Employees who have their caregiving needs 
accommodated are likely to work harder in appreciation of the 
accommodation and to stay with the employer on a more long-term 
basis.105  Studies indicate that women who work for family-friendly 
companies take fewer sick days, work on their own more, and are more 
likely to return to work after giving birth.106 Similarly, it may be 
economically advantageous for employers to hire part-time employees 
since part-time employees may be more efficient than full-time 
employees.107 
By failing to accommodate working parents, employers are also limiting 
their pool of potential employees, and particularly employees with certain 
                                                          
 102. See id. at 174 (noting that many employers regard work attendance as one of the 
most important factors in judging the performance of an employee). 
 103. Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 88.  But see generally Arnow-
Richman, supra note 3 (arguing that employers today are not likely to view employment 
relationships as long-term, and therefore, have less of an incentive to invest in employees). 
 104. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 86-88. 
 105. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 3, at 382 (recognizing the benefits enjoyed by 
employers from the increased employee loyalty that results from instituting FWAs). 
 106. See HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 31 (finding that workers who 
took advantage of FWAs performed better than most of their counterparts). 
 107. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 3, at 382 (describing how employers benefit by 
hiring part time employees); see also Cameron Stracher, All Aboard the Mommy Track, 21 
AM. LAW. 2 (1999) (suggesting that part-time employment for lawyers may be financially 
advantageous to employers). 
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qualities and skills.  This will become an increasing problem as the pool of 
potential employees decreases with the retiring of the baby boom 
generation.  Furthermore, there is growing recognition that the skills that 
one learns as a parent, such as increased empathy, efficiency, patience, and 
the ability to multitask, can be transferred to the workplace.108  In other 
words, parenting itself can help develop skills that many employers desire. 
Clearly, there are instances where it will be difficult or costly for 
employers to accommodate working parents.  However, there are also 
many cases where employers could save money and improve their bottom 
line by permitting FWAs and focusing on the quality, quantity, and 
timeliness of their employee’s work instead of on face time.109 
Lack of meaningful accommodation of working parents is clearly 
harmful to mothers, children, fathers, society, and employers.  Yet despite 
the harm caused by inadequate workplace accommodation, federal law has 
failed to adequately forbid discrimination against and mandate 
accommodation of working parents.  The failure of federal law to 
adequately address the needs of working parents will be discussed in the 
next Part. 
III. CURRENT LEGISLATION THAT PROTECTS WORKING PARENTS 
The FMLA110 and Title VII111 are two federal statutes that protect 
working parents.  The protection offered by both of these statutes is limited 
by the fact that neither addresses the ongoing needs of working parents.  
While the stated purpose of the FMLA is to “balance the demands of the 
workplace with the needs of families,”112 the statute in fact is premised on a 
“medical model” and essentially permits a covered employee only a limited 
amount of unpaid leave to care for her own or her family’s medical needs.  
Title VII, an anti-discrimination statute, is premised on the concept of 
formal equality, and as an antidiscrimination statute does not recognize or 
address the needs of parents or children.  This Part highlights both the 
protection offered by FMLA and Title VII as well as the limitations of 
these statutes.113 
                                                          
 108. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Parenting Can Create Better Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
12, 2004, § 10, at 1 (addressing the overlapping skills required by both parents and 
managers); see also Robin Wilson, How Babies Alter Careers for Academics, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 15, 2003 (explaining how academia suffers by its refusal to 
accommodate mothers). 
 109. See HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 174-78 (emphasizing how face time is at best an 
imprecise measure of an employee’s attitude towards work). 
 110. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000). 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). 
 112. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1). 
 113. This Article focuses on the limited protection that working parents receive under the 
FMLA and Title VII’s prohibition of disparate treatment discrimination and disparate 
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A. The Family and Medical Leave Act 
The FMLA,114 which is the first federal statute to address the issue of 
parental leave,115 was enacted by Congress in 1993 and provides leave for 
both men and women.  The Act’s preamble emphasizes the importance of 
parenting, noting that “it is important for the development of children and 
the family unit that fathers and mothers be able to participate in early 
childrearing.”116  Lack of accommodation of working parents “can force 
individuals to choose between job security and parenting.”117  
Unfortunately, the actual protection provided by the FMLA falls far short 
of the interests discussed in the preamble.118 
With regard to parenting, the FMLA permits a limited number of 
“eligible employees” to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year 
after the birth or adoption of a child,119 or to care for a child with a “serious 
health condition.”120  The FMLA applies only to employers with fifty or 
more employees,121 which limits the number of covered employers.  The 
number of employees covered by the FMLA is further limited by the fact 
that employees must have been employed by the covered employer for at 
least twelve months prior to taking leave and must have worked at least 
1,250 hours,122 or about twenty-five hours a week, during the preceding 
year.  This provision has a discriminatory impact on women, “since women 
are more likely than men to work for small businesses, to work part-time, 
to work in occupations with little job security, and to interrupt their careers 
                                                          
impact discrimination.  However, there are a number of other legal theories that plaintiffs in 
parental discrimination cases have occasionally relied on with some success.  These theories 
include constructive discharge and retaliation claims under Title VII, Equal Pay Act claims, 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims, equal protection and due process claims, 
and claims under state statutes and state common law.  Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, 
supra note 3, at 78-79. 
 114. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. 
 115. See generally Young, supra note 43. 
 116. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2). 
 117. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(3). 
 118. See Maxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round Hole:  Parenting Policies and Liberal 
Theory, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 148-50 (1998) (concluding that the FMLA fails to protect a 
broader concept of parenting); see also Kessler, supra note 3, at 419-30 (discussing the 
limitations of the FMLA); Malin, supra note 45, at 50-55 (describing how the FMLA has 
failed to adequately protect working fathers); Young, supra note 43, at 138-53 (arguing that 
the FMLA does not promote equal career opportunities for women or adequately provide for 
children’s needs). 
 119. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2)(A), 2612(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
 120. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).  The Act also permits an employee to take up to twelve 
weeks of unpaid leave per year to deal with his or her own serious health condition or the 
serious health condition of a spouse or parent.  29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C)-(D).  This Article 
focuses on the provisions of the Act specifically related to parental leave. 
 121. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i). 
 122. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(a)(i)-(ii).  See Dowd, supra note 10, at 238 n.84 (explaining 
that while approximately two-thirds of employees work for covered employers, only about 
one-half of the workforce is eligible for leave due to the requirements regarding the number 
of hours worked and time on the job). 
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due to family responsibilities.”123  Furthermore, because a maximum of 
twelve weeks is provided for both pregnancy and the care of a newborn 
infant, a mother with a difficult pregnancy might use up most or all of her 
leave before her child is even born. 
The FMLA also does not mandate wage replacement, but only requires 
employers to provide unpaid leave.124  As a result, many employees entitled 
to leave under the FMLA simply cannot afford to take it.125  Most single 
working parents, who are predominantly women and disproportionately 
members of minority groups, cannot afford to take unpaid leave.126  Lower-
income employees often cannot afford to take leave.127  Similarly, in dual-
income households where both incomes are necessary, parents cannot 
afford to take unpaid leave.128  The unpaid leave provision also makes it 
more likely that the women in dual-income families, who tend to have 
lower salaries, will be the partner to take the leave.129 
The Act also discriminates against highly compensated employees 
because FMLA coverage does not extend to key employees.130  This 
provision sends a clear message to financially successful men and women 
that they may have to sacrifice their family as a price of their success.131  
Because men tend to be higher paid than women and are more likely to be 
“key employees,” this provision further decreases the likelihood that 
fathers will take leave.132 
                                                          
 123. Kessler, supra note 3, at 422. 
 124. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d). 
 125. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 422-23 (arguing that only the most privileged working 
women can afford to take advantage of the FMLA’s protections because of the FMLA’s 
unpaid leave provision); Young, supra note 43, at 140 (stating that because the leave is 
unpaid, individuals and their families bear the financial burden of taking leave). 
 126. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 422 & n.287 (noting that single mothers are 
disproportionately minorities and that over one-half of all black families with children under 
eighteen are headed by single mothers). 
 127. See Dowd, supra note 10, at 238 n.84 (citing COMM’N ON LEAVE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, A WORKABLE BALANCE:  REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE 
POLICIES 65, 168 (1995)). 
 128. See Young, supra note 43, at 141 (noting that most dual-income families require 
both incomes and, thus, FMLA’s unpaid leave provision is insufficient for such families). 
 129. Id. (quoting Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Family:  A Blueprint for 
Family Leave, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 341 (1993)); see also Jolls, supra note 51, at 15 
(arguing that sex discrimination prevents women from attaining more prestigious higher 
paying positions). 
 130. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b) (2000); Young, supra note 43, at 144.  The FMLA allows 
an employer to deny job restoration to an employee if “such denial is necessary to prevent 
substantial and grievous economic injury to the operations of the employer” and if the 
employee “is among the highest paid 10 percent of the employees employed by the 
employer within 75 miles of the facility at which the employee is employed.”  29 U.S.C. §§ 
2614(b)(1)(A), 2614(b)(2). 
 131. See Young, supra note 43, at 144.  
 132. Id. at 143; see also Malin, supra note 45, at 49-55 (commenting that the FMLA 
provides only limited job restoration protection and that the absence of such protection 
deters men, who tend to be the primary breadwinners, from taking leave). 
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The most significant defect of the FMLA with regard to parental 
accommodation is the fact that it is premised on the “medical model.”133  
With the exception of permitting leave within the first year of a child’s 
birth or for the adoption of a child, the FMLA only permits leave for a 
parent to care for a child with a “serious health condition.”134  The Act’s 
restrictive definition of “serious health condition” excludes the numerous 
common childhood ailments, such as a cold, the flu, an ear infection, or a 
stomachache, for which parents are most likely to require leave.135  The 
FMLA also fails to provide parental leave for any non-medical reason.136  
Specifically, parents are not entitled to leave under the FMLA for 
appointments with teachers and principals, snow days, school vacation 
days, other school closings, last minute baby-sitter cancellations, or any 
other non-medical emergencies.137  The Act, therefore, does not provide 
leave for the most common reasons—medical or non-medical—for which 
parents need time off to care for their children.138 
Legal commentators have made suggestions on how to improve the 
FMLA and make it more parent friendly,139 and legislation has been 
introduced that would expand the scope of the FMLA.140  While the author 
                                                          
 133. See Eichner, supra note 118, at 149-50 (explaining that the FMLA does not 
encompass a broader concept of care).  In an article published the same year that the FMLA 
was passed, one commentator who was critical of the American legal system’s focus on 
“women’s disability, illness, and infirmity” as the primary rationale for parental leave, 
expressed hope that the FMLA could nudge American law in a new direction.  Wright-
Carozza, supra note 37, at 571. 
 134. A serious health condition is defined as “an illness, injury, impairment, or physical 
or mental condition that involves—(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential 
medical care facility; (B) or continuing treatment by a health care provider.”  29 U.S.C. § 
2611(11)(A)-(B); see also Young, supra note 43, at 142-43 (discussing the definition of a 
serious health condition under the FMLA).  Serious health conditions include 
Heart attacks, heart conditions requiring heart bypass or valve operations, most 
cancers, back conditions requiring extensive therapy or surgical procedures, 
strokes, severe respiratory conditions, spinal injuries, appendicitis, pneumonia, 
emphysema, severe arthritis, severe nervous disorders, injuries caused by serious 
accidents on or off the job, ongoing pregnancy, miscarriage, complications or 
illness related to pregnancy, such as severe morning sickness, the need for prenatal 
care, childbirth and recovery from childbirth. 
Smith, supra note 3, at 1450 n.43 (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 29 (1993), reprinted in 
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 31). 
 135. HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 24. 
 136. See, e.g., Eichner, supra note 118, at 150 (arguing that the Act “completely 
disregards other needs, deeming medical needs the only ones worthy of legal protection”). 
 137. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 429; Smith, supra note 3, at 1446-47 (describing 
routine childcare responsibilities that require short-term absences from work, but which are 
not covered under the FMLA). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See generally Dowd, supra note 10, at 250-51 (recommending reforms to the 
FMLA including universal paid leave); Young, supra note 43, at 153-60 (recommending 
that the FMLA provide wage replacement funded by taxes, that the maximum leave period 
be extended beyond twelve weeks, and that the number of covered employees be increased). 
 140. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 463 (discussing legislation that would expand covered 
activities to include participation in a child’s school or extracurricular activities). 
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supports many of these proposals, this Article focuses on expanding the 
scope of parental rights in the workplace by developing an accommodation 
model based on section 701(j) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
B. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
1. Disparate treatment 
Employees have had limited success in gaining parental accommodation 
by relying on Title VII’s disparate treatment theory of discrimination, 
which prohibits intentional discrimination based upon a protected category 
such as sex.141  Courts have recognized that disparate treatment extends to 
the prohibition of discrimination based on “sex plus” another neutral 
characteristic, such as parental status.  In Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp,142 a case involving parental discrimination, the United States 
Supreme Court considered the applicability of the “sex plus” theory of 
discrimination.  The Martin Marietta Corporation refused to hire women 
with pre-school aged children, despite the fact that it employed men with 
pre-school aged children.143  The Court held that Martin Marietta violated 
Title VII by intentionally treating women with young children differently 
than it treated men with young children.144 
The primary limitation of the disparate treatment analysis is that it 
essentially mandates little more than formal equality in the workplace.  
Employers cannot treat mothers differently than either fathers or childless 
female employees based upon stereotypes or generalizations regarding 
working mothers.145  Therefore, mothers who are capable of succeeding in 
the workplace, which is currently structured around the life patterns of the 
traditional man,146 may not be penalized based on their employer’s views of 
                                                          
 141. See Chamallas, supra note 3, at 339 (hypothesizing that few “mother 
discrimination” cases are brought because of the difficulty plaintiffs face in winning these 
cases); Eichner, supra note 118, at 138-40 & n.18 (arguing that Title VII’s focus is too 
limited because it ignores the needs of families and children); Kessler, supra note 3, at 400-
12 (discussing cases where Title VII has failed to give women workplace accommodation 
for their caregiving responsibilities); Smith, supra note 3, at 1456-59 (arguing that because 
disparate treatment focuses on intentional discrimination it fails to adequately resolve 
conflicts between work and family). 
 142. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).  See generally Chamallas, supra note 3, at 339-
48 (detailing the history of Martin Marietta Corp.). 
 143. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. at 543. 
 144. Id. at 544. 
 145. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 339; Kessler, supra note 3, at 401-02 (discussing 
successful outcomes for plaintiffs in cases involving hiring or promotion where an employer 
bases a decision solely on stereotypes regarding a woman’s responsibilities to her children). 
 146. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (describing an American workplace 
revolving around the schedule of a man with a stay-at-home wife who takes care of the 
children). 
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working mothers.147  However, the ban on disparate treatment provides 
little help for working parents, particularly working mothers, who in fact 
need some accommodation of their parenting obligations.148  Furthermore, 
because the goal of Title VII is to eradicate discrimination, the statute 
simply does not address the needs of children or the importance of 
parenting.149 
Disparate treatment claims are further limited by evidentiary burdens.150  
In some cases, there is no similarly situated employee to whom the plaintiff 
can be compared151 because the workforce today remains highly segregated 
by gender.152  Plaintiffs are also most likely to be successful where they 
have direct statements of bias against working mothers, but, in many cases, 
this type of “smoking gun” evidence does not exist.153 
However, in a recent article, Professors Williams and Segal argue that 
Title VII’s prohibition on disparate treatment is not an empty remedy and 
                                                          
 147. See, e.g., Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 22505, 1998 WL 912101, at **5-7 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998) (finding that the mother of two young children who was an 
attorney established a prima facie case of discrimination when her employer passed her over 
for promotion and instead offered the position to less qualified men with children and a 
woman without children). 
 148. Kessler, supra note 3, at 402-12 (citing Martinez v. NBC, 49 F. Supp. 2d 305 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Chi v. Age Group, Ltd., No. 94 Civ. 5253, 1996 WL 627580 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 29, 1996); Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, 926 F. Supp. 653, 656 (M.D. Tenn. 
1996); Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833, 1996 WL 374151 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 
1996)) (discussing cases where women have been unsuccessful in using Title VII to obtain 
workplace accommodation for their caregiving responsibilities).  But see Williams & Segal, 
Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 103-06 (advocating the potential for success under Title VII 
and characterizing the cases, including the ones cited immediately above, often used by 
critics of Title VII as reflecting “weak facts and weak lawyering”). 
 149. See Eichner, supra note 118, at 139 (“The problem is not chiefly that 
antidiscrimination law is failing to fulfill the function intended by Congress, but that its 
function, by nature, is limited.”). 
 150. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 416 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 
U.S. 977, 994 (1988)) (explaining that, while the Supreme Court requires that statistical 
disparities be sufficiently substantial to raise the inference of causation, plaintiffs are 
frequently unable to provide statistically significant evidence of disparate treatment because 
of the lack of relevant comparisons). 
 151. See, e.g., Fuller, 926 F. Supp. at 657 (denying relief to an employee who failed to 
make a prima facie claim of discrimination because she was replaced by another mother and 
failed to show that she had been treated differently than a father would have been treated); 
Bass, 1996 WL 374151, at *5 (dismissing plaintiff’s claim that she was denied promotion 
because she was a married mother with two young children and concluding that plaintiff 
offered no evidence to show employer “treated her differently than married men or men 
with children”).  But see Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 
113, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2004) (permitting the case to proceed even though the plaintiff did not 
establish that she was treated differently than a man would have been treated).  See 
generally Camel Sileo, Second Circuit Tears Down ‘Maternal Walls’, 40 TRIAL 95 (2004), 
for a discussion of the groundbreaking nature of the Back case. 
 152. See, e.g., id. 
 153. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 353.  But see Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra 
note 3, at 95 (noting that “[t]hough hostile prescriptive stereotyping is rare in contexts 
outside parenthood—most people know enough not to proclaim that ‘woman don’t belong 
here’—some employers are not yet as savvy when it comes to family caregivers”). 
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that scholars “have underestimated the potential for disparate treatment 
suits.”154  They argue that the cases relied upon by scholars who 
underestimate its utility involve “weak facts and weak lawyering”155 and 
that there are a number of cases in which plaintiffs do succeed in disparate 
treatment cases.156  They also point out that there are a number of disparate 
treatment claims that have resulted in large monetary awards despite the 
fact they did not produce legal decisions.157  Williams and Segal, however, 
do agree that plaintiffs are generally most successful in cases in which the 
adverse job action was “based on stereotypical views that motherhood 
renders women less capable of and less suited for performing competitively 
in the workplace than men and women without children.”158  Therefore, 
while a caregiver may be successful in bringing a disparate treatment 
lawsuit, this success is most likely in cases in which the caregiver is 
arguing for little more than formal equality.159 
2. Disparate impact 
The disparate impact theory of discrimination would seem to provide 
more protection to working parents who are discriminated against on the 
job as a result of their parenting obligations.  Unlike disparate treatment, 
disparate impact does not require intentional discrimination.  Instead, it 
focuses on equality of result and prohibits employers from engaging in 
neutral policies that have a disproportionately negative effect on employees 
who are members of a protected category.160 
For a number of reasons, however, caregivers have had only limited 
success relying on the disparate impact theory of discrimination.161  First, 
                                                          
 154. Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 108. 
 155. Id. at 106. 
 156. See id. at 124-30 (identifying and describing cases where mothers successfully 
challenged adverse job actions based on the disparate treatment analysis). 
 157. Id. at 130. 
 158. Id. at 125. 
 159. Professors Williams and Segal also explain that it is counterproductive for feminist 
legal scholars to focus so much attention on the failures of Title VII, since this does not help 
the attorneys who are actually litigating the caregiving cases.  Rather, they believe that 
attorneys can expand the scope of the law by litigating wisely, and that social change 
regarding the rights of caregivers in the workplace can also be brought about by “rights 
talk.”  Id. at 110-22. 
 160. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 436 (1971) (holding that employer 
could not use an employment test that disqualified African American applicants at 
substantially higher rates than white applicants and was not shown to be related to job 
performance). 
 161. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 287-89 (E.D. 
Tex. 1996) (denying employer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s challenge to employer’s sick 
leave policy, which limited leave to an employee’s own illness and had a disparate impact 
on women who were more likely than men to take sick leave to care for others); United 
States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 
650-55 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying employer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s challenge to 
employer’s leave policy, which had a disproportionately negative impact on female 
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an employee must identify a “neutral” policy that disproportionately affects 
the employment opportunities of members of a protected class.162  This is 
difficult since many “neutral” policies that negatively affect employees 
with parenting obligations, such as long hours, inflexible schedules, limited 
leave, and the requirement of working overtime on short notice, are not 
viewed as policies, but rather are viewed as the requirements of work 
itself.163  Employees have therefore had only limited success in challenging 
these “non policies.”164  While the disparate impact analysis may be used to 
ensure that women are given equal opportunities within the currently 
structured workplace, it has been less successful in challenging the very 
structure of the workplace and the assumption that an ideal employee has 
no caregiving responsibilities.165 
Once an employee successfully identifies a neutral policy, the employee 
must show that the challenged policy negatively affects women in 
comparison to men.166  However, it is only possible to make this showing if 
there are a statistically significant number of men who are similarly 
situated to the plaintiff, which is often not the case since much of the 
American workplace remains segregated by sex.167  Furthermore, men are 
less likely to be primary caregivers and are therefore less likely to work 
part-time, request parental leave, or use other flexible work 
arrangements.168  This trend may make it difficult for an employee to show 
that an employer has discriminated against women who use flexible work 
arrangements because there may not be a comparison group of similarly-
                                                          
employees). 
 162. Since women do the majority of childcare, the protected category is usually gender.  
See Kessler, supra note 3, at 420 (noting the FMLA’s finding that women often have 
primary caregiving responsibility). 
 163. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 413-14 (describing various “non policies” that fall 
under the definition of “work” and are therefore virtually non-actionable under Title VII).  
“While there are many identifiable, affirmative employer practices and policies that serve to 
disadvantage women in the workplace, they are so entrenched, so accepted as the norm, that 
they are virtually invisible.”  Id. at 413. 
 164. For a discussion of the limitations of disparate impact analysis with regard to the 
caregiving cases, see generally Kessler, supra note 3, at 412-19 (explaining that disparate 
impact offers only limited protection to working mothers); Smith, supra note 3, at 1457-59 
(discussing the limitations of disparate impact analysis in promoting work conditions that 
address the work-family conflict); and Peggie Smith, Parental-Status Discrimination:  A 
Wrong in Need of a Right?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 581-85 (noting obstacles to 
pleading a successful disparate impact case).  But see Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, 
supra note 3, at 108-10 (arguing that, although commentators have underestimated their 
potential, disparate impact suits can be successfully used to challenge job policies that 
disproportionately impact women with caregiving responsibilities). 
 165. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 3, at 413; Smith, supra note 3, at 1458. 
 166. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 415-16 (acknowledging that there is no precise 
formula to prove such disproportionate impact but that the “statistical disparities must be 
sufficiently substantial”) (citations omitted). 
 167. Smith, supra note 164, at 583. 
 168. See generally Malin, supra note 45.  
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situated men who have used such arrangements.169 
Finally, even if an employee shows that a neutral policy has a disparate 
impact on women, an employer can still use the “business necessity” 
defense.170  However, the growing body of literature regarding the business 
case for adopting family friendly workplace policies can be used by 
plaintiffs to overcome the business necessity defense.171 
Professors Williams and Segal argue that “disparate impact claims are 
useful in addressing discrimination faced by mothers and other family 
caregivers in the workplace,”172 and they cite a number of cases involving 
leave policies that have an adverse impact on women or policies that 
discriminate against employees with flexible work arrangements.173  
However, the author is unaware of any cases where an employee has been 
successful in claiming that long or inflexible work schedules have an 
adverse impact on women, who are more likely than men to be 
caregivers.174  Therefore, while the adverse impact theory of discrimination 
can be useful in some cases, it is limited by its inability to challenge the 
very structure of the workplace and by evidentiary burdens. 
This Part has focused on the limited protection working parents receive 
under both the Family and Medical Leave Act and Title VII.  The next Part 
examines how to provide more meaningful protection to working parents 
by developing a statute mandating parental accommodation in the 
                                                          
 169. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 3, at 416 n.249 (citing cases denying relief for 
plaintiffs due to plaintiffs’ inability to produce evidence of a similarly situated group of men 
as required to show disparate impact).  But see United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm’n v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 650, 655 (N.D. Ill. 1991) 
(finding that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of sex discrimination under the 
disparate impact theory of Title VII where fifty out of fifty-three employees who were 
terminated under the employer’s policy, which did not allow first year employees to take 
long-term sick leave, were women and where twenty of these women were pregnant). 
 170. For the business necessity defense to apply, the challenged practice must be “job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”  42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).  See also Kessler, supra note 3, at 416-17 (suggesting that the 
defense is effective for employers because courts perceive “less employer culpability in a 
disparate impact case”). 
 171. See, e.g., Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 88-89 & n.62 (arguing 
that businesses have an economic interest in developing “family-responsive policies,” which 
decrease “the costs associated with attrition, absenteeism, recruiting, quality control, and 
productivity”). 
 172. Id. at 134. 
 173. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 287-89 (E.D. 
Tex. 1996) (denying employer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s challenge to employer’s sick 
leave policy, which limited leave to an employee’s own illness and which had a disparate 
impact on women who were more likely than men to take sick leave to care for others); 
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 
647, 650-55 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying employer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s challenge to 
employer’s leave policy, which had a disproportionately negative impact on female 
employees). 
 174. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 415 (noting in 2001 that the author had not identified 
any cases “challenging long or inflexible work hours under a disparate impact theory”). 
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workplace based on section 701(j)’s requirement of religious 
accommodation in the workplace. 
IV. DEVELOPING A STATUTE MANDATING PARENTAL ACCOMMODATION 
IN THE WORKPLACE BASED ON SECTION 701(J) 
This Part examines how best to develop a statue mandating parental 
accommodation in the workplace based upon section 701(j) of Title VII, 
which mandates religious accommodation in the workplace.  This Part first 
provides an overview of section 701(j) and discusses why section 701(j) is 
an appropriate model to use in developing a statute mandating parental 
accommodation in the workplace.  This Part then turns to the primary 
issues that the federal courts have faced in interpreting the terms 
“reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship,” under section 701(j) 
and discusses how these terms should be defined in a statute mandating 
parental accommodation in the workplace. 
A. Why the Balancing Approach of Section 701(j) is Appropriate 
The accommodation model of section 701(j) is appropriate to use in 
addressing the needs of working parents because it recognizes the 
limitations of formal equality.  Title VII was initially enacted to prohibit 
discrimination against minority groups.  As originally passed, Title VII 
prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of religion but did not 
affirmatively mandate accommodation of religious employees.175  In 1972 
Congress amended Title VII by enacting section 701(j), which 
affirmatively requires an employer to “reasonably accommodate” an 
employee’s religious observance or practice unless the employer can 
demonstrate that such accommodation would cause him “undue 
hardship.”176 
In enacting section 701(j), Congress specifically recognized that the 
formal equality required under Title VII had not adequately protected 
religious employees in the workplace.  The pre-1972 religious 
accommodation case law had demonstrated that while employers could not 
discriminate on the basis of religion, employers had no affirmative duty to 
accommodate an employee’s religious needs.177  Employers could therefore 
                                                          
 175. The Act provides that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
 177. See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 1970) 
(determining that failure to accommodate an employee’s religious observance should not be 
equated with religious discrimination), aff’d mem. by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 
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legally establish a standard work week for all their employees, regardless 
of whether the effect of such a schedule would be to cause a conflict for 
religious employees.  Because the workplace, to a large extent, is structured 
around the holidays of the Christian majority, it was members of minority 
religious groups who most often needed their religious practices 
accommodated.178 
Similarly, formal equality has not provided adequate protection to 
working parents.  Just as the American workplace is structured around the 
Christian majority, the American workplace today remains structured 
around the life patterns of the traditional patriarchal man who has no 
childcare responsibilities.179  As explained in Part I, this structure 
essentially ignores the life patterns of mothers, who are primarily 
responsible for childcare.180  Therefore, simply permitting women (as well 
as men with childcare responsibilities) to enter the workplace as it is 
currently structured will not provide true equality for working parents.  
Many excellent employees with caregiving responsibilities are simply 
unable to work the long inflexible hours required by many of the best 
jobs.181  Just as section 701(j) recognized that formal equality did not 
provide adequate protection to religious employees in the workplace, the 
need for “reasonable accommodation” of working parents is premised upon 
the fact that the law does not adequately protect working parents with 
childcare responsibilities.182 
Some legal commentators have criticized the accommodation approach 
by arguing that it sends the message that parents, usually mothers, are 
asking for special treatment.183  While this is a concern, the fact remains 
                                                          
689 (1971) (per curiam); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583, 590 (M.D. Fla. 1971) 
(determining that an employer did not have an obligation to affirmatively accommodate an 
employee who was a Sabbatarian), rev’d, 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 178. Engel, supra note 12, at 388 n.302.  Section 701(j) was introduced by Senator 
Jennings Randolph with the express purpose of protecting Sabbatarians.  118 CONG. REC. 
705 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph). 
 179. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (describing the “ideal worker”). 
 180. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (providing statistics showing that women 
do the majority of childcare). 
 181. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that two-thirds of 
mothers work fewer than forty hours per week and ninety-five percent of mothers work 
fewer than fifty hours per week during the important career building years from ages 
twenty-five to forty-four). 
 182. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1460-64 (setting out the merits of the accommodation 
approach). 
 183. See, e.g., Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 88 (arguing that the 
workplace is currently designed around the life patterns of men and what women need is not 
accommodation, but rather equality, and a workplace that takes into account the 
characteristics of women); see also Jolls, supra note 51, at 13 (arguing that women have 
additional caregiving responsibilities, in part, because sex discrimination causes them to be 
paid less, and that instead of focusing on the controversial idea of “restructuring the 
workplace” to improve women’s financial position, focus should be placed on aggressively 
enforcing antidiscrimination laws that would lead to increases in women’s salaries). 
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that Title VII’s mandate of formal equality has failed to adequately protect 
working parents, and additional protection is needed. 
Furthermore, recent scholarship casts doubt on the sharp distinction 
between prohibitions on discrimination and mandates of accommodation.184  
For example, the appropriate remedy in disparate impact cases may be to 
modify a practice as applied to a protected class, which essentially means 
requiring differential treatment, or accommodation, of certain 
employees.185  Scholarship on the work-family conflict has also minimized 
the accommodation/ discrimination distinction.186  Professor Williams 
supports litigation aimed at altering the way in which work is performed 
since the workplace is currently structured around the life patterns of 
traditional men without childcare responsibilities.187  In other words, an 
employer’s failure to adopt workplace practices that recognize the life 
patterns of caregivers constitutes a form of discrimination.  Furthermore, 
section 701(j) is drafted in a manner that minimizes the distinction between 
accommodation and discrimination since failure to accommodate a 
religious employee is viewed as a form of discrimination.188 
Section 701(j) is also an appropriate model to use because it recognizes 
and balances the needs of both employers and employees.189  The primary 
goal of an employer is to run a profitable business.  As a result, there will 
be some limitations on the extent to which working parents can be 
accommodated.  However, current law mandates minimal accommodation 
of working parents, regardless of the cost or inconvenience to employers.190  
Employers are now free to ignore the fact that there are many cases in 
which accommodation may well be cost-effective.  As Professors Williams 
and Segal explained in a recent article, a growing body of literature 
questions the assumption that accommodation is costly.  The literature 
reasons that a restructured workplace that institutes family friendly policies 
may save an employer money in the long run “by decreasing costs 
associated with attrition, absenteeism, recruiting, quality control and 
                                                          
 184. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 3, at 360 (discussing scholarship which argues that 
“negative directives,” such as those in Title VII, and “affirmative requirements,” such as 
those imposed by accommodation statutes, are not distinct but actually lie on a continuum). 
 185. See id. at 360-361 n. 52-54. 
 186. See id. at 361 (explaining that in her scholarship addressing the work-family 
conflict, Professor Williams has collapsed the “equality/accommodation” distinction). 
 187. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 101 (explaining that the threat 
of legal liability encourages social change, but cautioning that lawsuits are both financially 
and emotionally costly). 
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). 
 189. See id. (requiring reasonable accommodation of religious employees unless doing 
so would result in “undue hardship” on the employer’s business). 
 190. See supra Part II.E (explaining that employers are often concerned with issues such 
as face time and an employee’s ability to work long hours on short notice regardless of 
whether these factors correlate with the quality of an employee’s work). 
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productivity.”191  In other words, the American workplace is structured in a 
manner that both discriminates against parents with childcare 
responsibilities and in many cases does not even reflect true business 
needs. 
The author recognizes that every accommodation will not be appropriate 
in every workplace, and that situations exist where a particular 
accommodation would cause an employer to suffer “undue hardship.”  
While a law professor can easily write an article or book from home in the 
evening, other workplaces are not so adaptable.  For example, hospitals, 
schools, and restaurants must be staffed with doctors, teachers, and 
waitresses during the hours that they are in operation.  If one of these 
employers has a large number of employees requesting parental 
accommodation, the employer may not be able to accommodate all of 
them.  Courts interpreting section 701(j) have engaged in fact-specific 
analysis to determine which accommodations are appropriate in the various 
workplaces.192  Similarly, when disputes arise within the context of parental 
accommodation, courts can be expected to work out which 
accommodations are appropriate for different employers. 
Section 701(j) is also an appropriate model because both religious 
employees and working parents with childcare responsibilities have similar 
accommodation needs—primarily the need for a flexible work schedule 
that permits the employee to take time off.  The majority of cases brought 
under section 701(j) involve employees requesting time off for religious 
observance.  Similarly, the accommodation most commonly needed by 
parents with childcare responsibilities is increased flexibility and time 
off.193  Many of the accommodations suggested by the United States Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidelines on 
Discrimination Because of Religion,194 including the use of flexible work 
schedules, voluntary substitutes, and lateral transfers would also be an 
appropriate means of accommodating working parents.  This Part will 
discuss other types of accommodations, such as permitting employees to 
work part-time or to work from home, that are also appropriate means of 
accommodating working parents. 
                                                          
 191. Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 88. 
 192. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 66 (1986) (agreeing with 
the Court of Appeals that the issue of reasonable accommodation cannot be resolved 
without further fact-finding); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (“[T]he decision of whether a particular accommodation works an undue 
hardship . . . must be made by considering the particular factual context of each case”) 
(citations omitted). 
 193. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 28-30 (revealing results of interviews 
suggesting that those with inflexible schedules and inability to take time off have the most 
childcare problems).  
 194. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)i-iii (2004). 
KAMINER.OFFTOPRINTER 8/9/2005  1:10:24 PM 
2004] THE WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT 335 
Professors Williams and Segal argue that section 701(j) is not an 
appropriate model for parental accommodation because 
the wide variety of religious practices . . . means that it will often be 
impossible to design a single norm to take into account all the diverse 
needs for religious accommodation.  In the work-family arena, there is 
not a dazzling array but a dyad.  The question is whether workplaces . . . 
will be redesigned to take into account the reproductive biology and 
social roles of women and family caregivers, as well.195 
However, the specific accommodation needs of working parents may 
differ as greatly from one another as the specific accommodation needs of 
adherents of different religious faiths.  Parents of school-age children may 
want to go to work early so they can be home when their children return 
from school, while parents of infants and toddlers may prefer having their 
mornings at home and working during the afternoon.  Children will get sick 
on different days and working parents will schedule appointments with 
teachers and principals on different days.  The situations of both caregivers 
and religious employees are similar in that they both require flexibility in 
their work schedules.  However, the specific accommodation needs of 
working parents may differ as greatly from one another as the specific 
needs of religious employees.196 
Some legal scholars have questioned the effectiveness of a statute 
mandating parental accommodation in the workplace based on section 
701(j) due to their concern that it will be an empty remedy.197  Both 
scholars who support using section 701(j) as a model for mandating 
parental accommodation in the workplace and scholars who oppose this 
model have accepted the view that courts have interpreted section 701(j) so 
narrowly as to render it “virtually useless for most employees whose 
religious practices conflict with work.”198  However, an exhaustive survey 
                                                          
 195. Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 84-85. 
 196. One distinction between religious accommodation and parental accommodation is 
that an employee can usually plan for religious needs (i.e. holidays, the Sabbath), while a 
working parent does not always know in advance all of the days that she will need off (i.e. 
sick days, snow days, unexpected school closings, etc.).  However, parents have some 
flexibility in scheduling school related appointments, while religious employees cannot 
schedule religious holidays. 
 197. According to Professors Williams and Segal, 
[A]dvocating a new statute along the lines of Title VII’s religious accommodation 
provision poses a risk:  why tell family caregivers to await the passage of a new 
law in order to gain rights, and then advocate, as a model, a statute that will likely 
be interpreted so narrowly as to provide little effective relief? 
Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 84; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 
3, at 349 (arguing that the American legal system’s commitment to formal equality limits 
the utility of mandated accommodation). 
 198. See Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 84 (quoting Smith, supra 
note 3, at 1479). 
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of the case law interpreting section 701(j) reveals a different outcome.199  
While some courts have narrowly interpreted an employer’s obligation 
under section 701(j), “[t]here are also courts that view an employee’s 
request for religious accommodation as important and worthy of protection 
and that require a more significant level of accommodation.”200  Therefore, 
while section 701(j) would certainly be more effective if amended,201 the 
author does not believe that it is an empty remedy. 
To the extent that section 701(j) fails to adequately protect religious 
employees in the workplace, a statute mandating parental accommodation 
in the workplace can be drafted so that it is not open to an overly narrow 
interpretation.202  In fact, Congress has recognized the need to strengthen 
section 701(j).  Specifically, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act,203 
which would both broaden and clarify the scope of section 701(j), has been 
introduced in numerous Congressional sessions.204  Furthermore, in 
mandating religious accommodation in the workplace, courts have 
expressed concern with violating the Establishment Clause,205 which is an 
issue that does not arise in the context of parental accommodation in the 
workplace.  There are also a number of reasons why it may be easier for 
employers to accommodate an employee’s bona fide parenting obligations 
than an employee’s religious needs, which will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next Subpart. 
The enactment of a statute mandating parental accommodation in the 
workplace would also raise the visibility and importance of this issue.  
Section 701(j) is valuable not only because religious employees have the 
ability to bring legal action,206 but also perhaps, more importantly, because 
of the lawsuits that never arise.  Employers understand that religious 
discrimination is illegal and that employees have some right to religious 
                                                          
 199. See generally Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and 
Consistent Protection of Religious Employees:  Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575 (2000) (illustrating the American legal system’s ambivalence towards 
accommodation of religious employees in the workplace). 
 200. Id. at 579 (citing Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1987); Opuku-
Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 201. See id. at 628-31 (proposing amendments to § 701(j) that would serve to clarify and 
broaden its scope). 
 202. It might be difficult to generate sufficient congressional support to enact a statute 
mandating parental accommodation in the workplace.  However, this is a different issue 
than the argument that any statute based on § 701(j) would fail to adequately protect 
working parents. 
 203. Workplace Religious Freedom Act, S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 204. See Kaminer, supra note 199, at 628 (documenting the bill’s introduction in the 
House of Representatives in 1994, its reintroduction in both Houses in 1996, as well as 
subsequent reintroductions of the bill); see also infra notes 301-303 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Workplace Religious Freedom Act). 
 205. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 206. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). 
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accommodation in the workplace.  The same cannot be said with regard to 
discrimination against working parents.  As Professors Williams and Segal 
point out, “[t]hough hostile prescriptive stereotyping is rare in contexts 
outside parenthood—most people know enough not to proclaim that 
‘woman don’t belong here’—some employers are not yet as savvy when it 
comes to family caregivers.”207  A statute mandating accommodation of 
working parents would raise the visibility of the work-family conflict and 
force employers to address the issue in a meaningful manner.  Once forced 
to address the issue, employers are more likely to recognize the business 
case for instituting a family friendly workplace. 
Furthermore, the public discussion that would surround any serious 
attempt to enact federal legislation mandating parental accommodation in 
the workplace would itself serve a valuable function.  In a recent article, 
Professors Williams and Segal emphasize the importance of “rights talk” in 
fueling social change.208  They argue that “‘rights talk’ can fuel social 
change by shaping people’s interpretations of who owes what to whom.”209  
The public discussion surrounding any proposed statute mandating parental 
accommodation would further encourage this type of rights talk.210 
This subpart has discussed why section 701(j) is an appropriate model to 
use in developing a statute mandating parental accommodation in the 
workplace.  The remainder of this Part discusses how courts have 
interpreted the terms “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” 
and how these terms should be defined in a statute mandating parental 
accommodation in the workplace. 
B. Reasonable Accommodation 
This subpart examines how federal courts have interpreted the 
requirement of reasonable accommodation, and how this requirement 
should be defined in a statute mandating parental accommodation in the 
workplace.  Courts have faced a number of questions in determining 
                                                          
 207. Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 95.  Professors Williams and 
Segal have found that “loose lips” or “hostile prescriptive stereotyping of mothers and 
pregnant woman” are commonplace.  Id. at 106. 
 208. Id. at 113-22. 
‘Rights talk’ can change what people feel they are entitled to from their employers; 
what employers feel they need to provide to their employees; what type of diversity 
training is provided; what financial advisors may recommend to improve the 
bottom line; what human resource personnel recommend to recruit and retain good 
employees; and what corporate counsel advise their clients to do in order to comply 
with the law and avoid liability.   
Id. at 121. 
 209. Id. at 113. 
 210. See id. (stating that “if discrimination language is successful in the court of public 
opinion but not in courts of law, it could help spur an effort to enact legislation to protect the 
rights people have been convinced they have”). 
KAMINER.OFFTOPRINTER 8/9/2005  1:10:24 PM 
338 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:305 
whether an employee has been reasonably accommodated under section 
701(j),211 and many of these questions are equally relevant with regard to 
parental accommodation in the workplace.  To what extent is an employee 
required to cooperate with his employer and/or make compromises?  Is an 
accommodation reasonable only if it eliminates the employee’s conflict?  
How much economic cost can an employer be required to bear before the 
accommodation is no longer considered reasonable?  These questions—and 
their application to a statute mandating parental accommodation in the 
workplace—will be discussed in this Subpart. 
1. Accommodating “bona fide parenting obligations” 
To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under section 
701(j), an employee must first demonstrate a “bona fide religious belief, the 
practice of which conflicted with an employment duty.”212  In other words, 
the employee must show that the requested accommodation was for the 
type of belief or practice that the statute was enacted to protect. 
In developing a statute mandating parental accommodation in the 
workplace, the first issue is determining which parental obligations 
employers must accommodate.  It would be very difficult for employers to 
accommodate every instance in which an employee has conflicting work 
and family obligations.  Working parents may be unable to attend every 
soccer game or dance recital and will need to arrange for other people to 
care for their children while they work.  At the other extreme, absent some 
compelling justification, parents should not be forced to choose between 
their jobs and caring for a hospitalized child, or leaving a young child at 
home alone.213 
In a recent article, Professor Smith argues that only “compelling parental 
obligations” or family responsibilities that are “compelling and 
necessitous” should be accommodated.214  Professor Smith relies on 
unemployment compensation case law to develop criteria for determining 
                                                          
 211. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 199, at 596-610 (examining how courts have 
interpreted the requirement of reasonable accommodation). 
 212. The courts use a two-part procedure when analyzing claims under § 701(j).  First, a 
plaintiff must meet a three-part test to establish a prima facie case of religious 
discrimination.  “The employee must establish that ‘(1) he had a bona fide religious belief, 
the practice of which conflicted with an employment duty; (2) he informed his employer of 
the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer threatened him or subjected him to 
discriminatory treatment . . . .’”  See Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1467 n.9 
(9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993)).  The 
employer then has the burden to show that it “negotiate[d] with the employee in an effort to 
reasonably accommodate the employee’s religious beliefs.”  Id. at 1467 (quoting Heller, 8 
F.3d at 1438). 
 213. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 3, at 1468-70 (describing three cases in which claimants 
either resigned or were discharged when faced with childcare concerns that conflicted with 
work schedules). 
 214. See id. at 1471.  
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which parental obligations are “compelling.”215  She specifically cites cases 
involving employees who were granted unemployment compensation after 
being separated from their jobs as a result of a change in their employment 
schedules which conflicted with their childcare responsibilities.216  While 
the author agrees that this type of “compelling parental obligation” should 
certainly be accommodated, the author is also concerned that courts might 
interpret “compelling parental obligation” in an overly restrictive manner. 
Therefore, the author proposes that an employee should be required to 
demonstrate that she has a “bona fide parenting obligation”217 that conflicts 
with her employment responsibilities.  This more liberal standard should 
specifically include two types of parenting obligations not explicitly 
discussed by Professor Smith.  First, the “bona fide parenting obligation” 
standard should recognize that parents may sometimes need to miss work 
to attend important appointments regarding their children.  For example, 
there may be times that parents have no choice but to schedule a child’s 
medical appointments during the workday, particularly if the child has 
special needs.218  Similarly, parents may need to attend appointments with a 
child’s teacher or principal, particularly emergency appointments, which 
must be scheduled during the work day. 
Second, the bona fide standard should permit the aggregation of events 
in determining the importance of a parental obligation.  For example, while 
it is unlikely that most employees can attend all Little League games or 
dance recitals, an employer should have an obligation to accommodate an 
employee’s need to occasionally attend some school activities, particularly 
because the employee will also have an obligation to compromise and work 
with his or her employer in determining which events to attend.219  This 
should not present an undue hardship to most employers, as there are 
currently state statues that provide parents with a set number of hours off 
per year to participate in their children’s school activities.220  While the 
                                                          
 215. See id. at 1467-70 (borrowing from the concept of good cause that has been 
articulated in unemployment compensation cases involving work-family conflicts). 
 216. The three cases cited by Professor Smith are White v. Sec. Link, 658 A.2d 619 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1994); Newland v. Job Serv. N.D., 460 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990); and King v. 
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 414 A.2d 452 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980). 
 217. This standard is also used under § 701(j), which defines religion as including “all 
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) 
(2002); see also Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(requiring plaintiff to demonstrate a “bona fide religious belief”). 
 218. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 80 (noting that, due to work related conflicts, 
one out of four parents interviewed in a recent study had difficulty making appointments 
with medical specialists). 
 219. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing an employee’s duty to cooperate and compromise 
with her employer).   
 220. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1455 n.63 (listing several examples of state statutes that 
allow eligible employees a set number of hours off per year to participate in their children’s 
activities).   
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definition of “bona fide parenting obligations” will in some instances be 
fact specific, this has also been an issue for courts that have addressed 
whether an employee has a “bona fide religious belief”221 under section 
701(j). 
2. The limitations of Ansonia 
Under section 701(j), once an employee establishes a prima facie case of 
religious discrimination, a court must determine whether the employee’s 
religious needs have been reasonably accommodated.  An employer’s 
obligation to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious needs was 
narrowly interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Ansonia Board 
of Education v. Philbrook.222  The Court held that “where the employer has 
already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the 
statutory inquiry is at an end.  The employer need not further show that 
each of the employee’s alternative accommodations would result in undue 
hardship.”223  In so ruling, the Court disregarded the EEOC’s 1980 
Guidelines which stated that “when there is more than one means of 
accommodation which would not cause undue hardship, the employer . . . 
must offer the alternative which least disadvantages the individual with 
respect to his or her employment opportunities.”224 
Ansonia involved a high school teacher, Ronald Philbrook, who was a 
member of the Worldwide Church of God and whose religious beliefs 
required him to be absent from school to celebrate approximately six 
religious holidays each year.225  His employer permitted him to take three 
days of authorized paid leave for religious holidays and another three days 
of unauthorized leave—time without pay—for any additional holidays that 
he could not work.226  Philbrook proposed two alternatives to his 
employer’s arrangement—either take paid personal leave,227 or pay for the 
cost of a substitute teacher and receive full pay for religious holidays in 
excess of the three days allotted for religious observance.228  The employer 
                                                          
 221. For example, a recent case discussed whether an employee who was a member of 
the Church of Body Modification had a sincerely held religious belief that required her to 
display facial piercings at all times.  See Cloutier v. Costco, 311 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 
2004). 
 222. 479 U.S. 60 (1986). 
 223. Id. at 68. 
 224. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (2004). 
 225. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 62-63. 
 226. Id. at 64. 
 227. Id. at 64-65. Philbrook was not permitted to take personal leave since it could not be 
used for purposes for which there was already a designated leave and therefore could not be 
used for religious reasons.  Id. at 63. 
 228. Id. at 65.  This would reduce the cost to Philbrook since in 1984 the cost of hiring a 
substitute teacher was $30 a day and Philbrook’s lost pay was $130 a day.  Id. at 65 n.3. 
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rejected Philbrook’s proposals.229  Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, 
explained that Philbrook’s conflict was not fully resolved because he was 
still forced to give up pay in order to follow his religious beliefs.230 
Ansonia’s central holding has been criticized for failing to adequately 
protect religious employees.231  In developing a statute mandating parental 
accommodation in the workplace, the standard articulated by the EEOC, 
which was relied upon by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in its 
decision in favor of Philbrook232 and by Justice Marshall’s dissenting 
opinion in Ansonia,233 should be adopted.  An employer should be required 
to provide a working parent with the “alternative which least disadvantages 
the individual,” so long as doing so does not cause “undue hardship” to the 
employer.  This standard would provide meaningful accommodation to 
working parents and at the same time ensure that an employer not bear an 
overly burdensome cost since it is only “bona fide parental obligations” 
that must be accommodated, and they only need to be accommodated if 
they do not cause “undue hardship” to an employer. 
3. The duty to cooperate and the duty to compromise 
The courts generally agree that a religious employee has a duty to 
cooperate with his employer in securing an accommodation for his 
religious needs.234  Employees, therefore, regularly lose cases when they 
fail to make use of means provided by the employer that could have 
resolved their conflicts.235  The courts also agree that an employee’s duty to 
                                                          
 229. Id. at 65. 
 230. Id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 231. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 199, at 592-96.  
 232. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 484 (2d Cir. 1985), rev’d, 479 
U.S. 60 (1986). 
 233. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 234. See, e.g., Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69 (quoting Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 
F.2d 141, 145-46 (5th Cir. 1982)) (asserting that the employer and the employee must 
cooperate in order to find an acceptable accommodation of an employee’s religious beliefs); 
Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 501, 503 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that an 
employee has an obligation to “be flexible” in finding a solution and that an employer has 
satisfied Title VII’s requirements even if it offers a reasonable accommodation that is not 
the employee’s preference); Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 223 F.3d 220, 227 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (stating that once an employer attempted to negotiate with a religious employee 
regarding alternative positions within the organization, the employee had a duty to 
cooperate with the employer); Hudson v. W. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 261, 266-67 (9th Cir. 
1988) (finding that an employer satisfied Title VII’s requirements when it offered 
reasonable means of accommodating a religious employee’s conflicts despite the 
employee’s failure to consider the employer’s offer); Weilert v. Health Midwest Dev. 
Group, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1197 (D. Kan. 2000) (noting that a religious employee “may 
not assert an absolute right to a different accommodation” and that the employee must 
attempt to cooperate when the employer offers an accommodation). 
 235. See, e.g., Hudson, 851 F.2d at 266 (holding that plaintiff had been reasonably 
accommodated by her employer and that she failed to make use of her options under the 
collective bargaining agreement). 
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cooperate arises only after the employer makes an initial attempt to 
accommodate the employee.236 
The lower courts, do not, however, agree on how far this duty of 
employee cooperation extends.  Most courts have determined that 
employees do not have an obligation to compromise their religious 
beliefs.237  This determination makes sense in the context of religious 
accommodation, because it is only when an employee has a sincerely held 
religious belief—that is, an unbending belief on which he or she cannot 
compromise—that the employee would even invoke the protection of 
section 701(j).238  However, some courts have found that the duty of 
cooperation places an obligation on the part of employees to compromise 
their religious beliefs.239 
It is unclear whether an employee’s duty to cooperate includes an 
obligation to reschedule his religious observances in cases in which 
rescheduling would not require the employee to compromise his religious 
beliefs.  While the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have stated that an employee 
may have an obligation to reschedule where possible,240 the Ninth Circuit 
has stated that the duty to cooperate does not necessarily include a duty to 
reschedule since “[a]n inflexible duty to reschedule would impose too great 
a burden on employees who desire to attend religious ceremonies for which 
                                                          
 236. See, e.g., Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing 
that the employee’s obligation to cooperate only arises after the employer has offered a 
potential accommodation); Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1488-89 (10th Cir. 
1989) (holding that an employee’s duty to cooperate was not triggered because the employer 
failed to make an initial effort to accommodate the employee’s religious beliefs). 
 237. See Brener, 671 F.2d at 146 n.3 (stating that “[o]f course, an employee is not 
required to modify his religious beliefs . . . only to attempt to satisfy them within procedures 
offered by the employer”); see also United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n 
v. IBP, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 147, 154 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (stating that the employee’s duty to 
cooperate does not include a concomitant obligation to compromise the religious beliefs that 
Title VII was designed to protect). 
 238. See, e.g., Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that in order to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, an employee must 
begin by proving the existence of a “sincere religious belief that conflicts with an 
employment requirement”). 
 239. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(determining that the plaintiff had failed “to consider any sort of compromise insofar as his 
religion was concerned”). 
 240. See Howard v. Haverty Furniture Cos., 615 F.2d 203, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(finding that plaintiff made no effort to find a substitute minister to officiate at a funeral or 
to change the date of the funeral and, as a result of his absence, the employer suffered 
“undue hardship”); see also Dachman v. Shalala, No. 00-1641, 2001 WL 533760, at *4 (4th 
Cir. May 18, 2001) (determining that Title VII did not mandate that an employer allow an 
Orthodox Jewish plaintiff to leave work early on Friday afternoon to conduct her pre-
Sabbath preparations because the employee could perform many of the tasks during the 
week or on the Sabbath and because her religious beliefs did not require that she complete 
all of the preparations on Friday). 
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they might be able to change the date or time, such as baptisms, 
confirmations, or weddings.”241 
With regard to parental accommodation in the workplace, parents should 
be required to make a good faith effort to resolve their work-family 
conflicts before asking for any accommodation from their employer,242 as 
well as to compromise with their employer after asking for the 
accommodation.  This distinction recognizes that while religious 
observances usually cannot be rescheduled, many types of parental 
obligations can be rescheduled.243  For example, routine doctor 
appointments and parent-teacher conferences should not be scheduled at 
the same time as important meetings and whenever possible should not be 
scheduled during the workday.  If parents are given advance notice of a 
change in their schedules, they should be required to make a good faith 
attempt to find alternative childcare.244  This requirement differs from cases 
of religious accommodation where the employee’s obligation to 
compromise only arises after the employer attempts to accommodate the 
religious employee.  Therefore, a significantly higher level of compromise 
can be required of parents seeking accommodation in the workplace than 
that required of religious employees seeking accommodation under section 
701(j). 
On the other hand, some bona fide parenting obligations, such as 
unexpected childcare emergencies, cannot be rescheduled.  For example, if 
a young child wakes up with the flu one morning, or becomes ill during the 
school day, a parent may be unable to find alternative childcare on such 
short notice.  Similarly, a babysitter may cancel at the last minute, or a day 
care center may unexpectedly close.  On some occasions, a parent may 
know in advance of a bona fide parenting obligation that requires time off 
from work, such as an appointment with a medical specialist that can be 
made only during the workday.  Virtually every parent will at some point 
experience a childcare bind whether from illness, unexpected school 
closings, or emergency appointments. 
A gray area exists in which it is questionable whether a parent has made 
a good faith effort to work with the employer.  For example, one 
commentator writes of a mother who had a conflict with her boss since she 
left work at 3:40 on a number of Wednesdays to take her son for his weekly 
                                                          
 241. Heller, 8 F.3d at 1439. 
 242. Smith, supra note 3, at 1472-73.  It makes economic sense for the employer to work 
with the employee since no one solution is best for all employees or all workplaces.  
WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 86.  
 243. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1473. 
 244. See id. at 1472 & n.155 (arguing that if an employee is notified in advance of a 
change in her work schedule to include weekend hours the employee should be required to 
attempt to find alternative childcare). 
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asthma shots.245  While her husband or the child’s grandmother could have 
taken her son to the appointment, the mother wanted to go because her son 
was scared of the shots.246  In a case such as this, where other trusted family 
members are available, the employee should have an obligation to 
compromise. 
4. The issue of choice 
An issue that arises in cases involving religious accommodation in the 
workplace that has also been raised in the context of work-family conflicts 
is the issue of “choice.”247  Some commentators have suggested that just as 
individuals “choose” religion, individuals also choose whether to become 
parents and once parents, they choose whether or not to work.  According 
to this line of reasoning, both religion and parenting are little more than 
personal lifestyle choices. 
One commentator has suggested that section 701(j) may be a good model 
for parental accommodation in the workplace specifically because it “is 
based upon the notion that a person’s religious practices are a fundamental 
right, even if voluntarily adopted.”248  This argument misses the point, 
however, that a truly religious employee does not view religious 
observance as a matter of personal choice.  As one commentator explained, 
“It would come as some surprise to a devout Jew to find that he has 
selected the day of the week in which to refrain from labor, since the 
Jewish people have been under the impression for some 3,000 years that 
this choice was made by God.”249  In surveying the section 701(j) case law, 
it is not surprising that courts engaged in rhetoric implying that religious 
belief and observance are nothing more than a personal choice are unlikely 
to require an employer to reasonably accommodate a religious employee.250 
                                                          
 245. HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 135-38. 
 246. Id. at 137-38. 
 247. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Gender Wars:  Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1608-34 (explaining how the rhetoric of choice is inappropriately 
used when discussing the work-family conflict) [hereinafter Williams, Gender Wars]; 
Kessler, supra note 3, at 441-44 (discussing the limitations of “rational choice theory,” 
which assumes  that individuals engage in certain activities only after performing a cost-
benefit analysis and determining that the activity is in the individual’s best interest). 
 248. Kessler, supra note 3, at 457-58.  Kessler criticizes the “choice” theory with regard 
to parental accommodation in the workplace because it effectively narrows a parent’s right 
to accommodation.  Id. at 448-68. 
 249. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
115, 125 (1992). 
 250. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting that 
the plaintiff had failed to “consider any sort of compromise insofar as his religion was 
concerned”).  This conviction that religious belief and observance are a matter of personal 
choice is connected to the issue of an employee’s obligation to compromise his religious 
beliefs, since a court that requires an employee to compromise his religious beliefs implies 
that these beliefs are nothing more than a lifestyle choice. 
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Similarly, both courts251 and critics252 who dismiss the importance of 
workplace accommodation for parents often refer to the conflict these 
parents face as little more than a lifestyle choice they have voluntarily 
assumed.  A number of legal commentators have discussed the flaws in this 
reasoning.253  People do not always “choose” to become parents, and even 
when they do voluntarily choose to parent, it does not logically follow that 
society should not have an obligation to contributing to the cost of raising 
the next generation of citizens.254  This choice reasoning also ignores the 
fact that the choices given to the primary caretaker, who is usually the 
mother, are fundamentally unfair choices.  As Professor Williams explains, 
“In the work/family context, the rhetoric of choice masks a gender system 
that defines childrearing and the accepted avenues of adult advancement as 
inconsistent and then allocates the resulting costs of childrearing to 
mothers.”255  Furthermore, most women who are single, divorced, or do not 
have a high-wage earning spouse cannot simply choose not to work256 but 
rather must work to provide food and shelter for their children.  A parent 
with custody of a child similarly cannot simply choose not to care for the 
                                                          
 251. See United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Sears Roebuck & 
Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (determining that as a result of family 
responsibilities, women voluntarily chose lower-paying jobs), aff’d, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 
1988); see also Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 247, at 1608 (stating that Sears’ 
argument in the case that women’s marginalized economic status is a direct result of their 
personal choice of lower-paying work that enables them to spend more time at home with 
their families is commonly accepted by both conservative and liberal courts). 
 252. See, e.g., BURKETT, supra note 39, at 197 (stating that society generally should not 
reward or punish individuals’ private choices based on their impact on the public good, “or 
at least history teaches us about the dangers of doing so”). 
 253. See generally Eichner, supra note 118, at 147 (stating that the “parenting-as-choice” 
theory fails to consider the question of whether society has an interest in protecting 
children); Kessler, supra note 3, at 441-43 (discussing the limitations of applying rational 
choice theory to women’s cultural caregiving); Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 247, at 
1615 (stating that choice rhetoric fails to recognize the constraints within which women 
make choices about parenting); Wright-Carozza, supra note 37, at 577-78 (arguing that the 
legal system’s assumption that pregnancy and parenthood are merely products of personal 
choice fails to recognize the social value of having and raising children). 
 254. See Eichner, supra note 118, at 147 (stating that interpreting the choice theory to 
deny legal protection ignores the question of whether “society has some interest in and 
responsibility to children once parents have ‘chosen’ to bear them,” and concluding that 
society owes an obligation to help all human beings, regardless of whether their existence is 
a product of parental “choice”); Wright-Carozza, supra note 37, at 578 (questioning the 
premise that pregnancy and parenthood are always voluntarily undertaken, and asserting that 
even if these conditions are voluntary, society should share some of the costs of supporting 
workers who bear and raise children); see also supra Part II.D (emphasizing the importance 
of child-rearing in ensuring the future of our society and discussing the harm to society 
when parents are unable to spend adequate time with their children). 
 255. Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 247, at 1596. 
 256. See id. at 1610.  A recent cover story in The New York Times Magazine recognized 
that becoming a stay-at-home mother is usually only an option for “elite successful women 
who can afford real choice—who have partners with substantial salaries and health 
insurance.”  Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, at 42. 
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child because the parent would violate child welfare laws.257 
There is a risk that courts will rely on the choice line of reasoning to 
narrowly interpret a statute mandating parental accommodation in the 
workplace.  It is therefore important to emphasize that “bona fide parenting 
obligations” are not simply a matter of personal choice.  While employees 
should have an obligation to work with their employers in reaching an 
accommodation, this obligation should not negate the employers’ duty to 
accommodate.  While both caregiving and religious belief may not be 
immutable characteristics in the sense of race, gender, and national origin, 
they are also more than a matter of personal lifestyle “choice” and are 
worthy of federal protection. 
5. Elimination of the employee’s conflict 
An issue that has surfaced in the section 701(j) case law is whether an 
accommodation can be reasonable if it does not eliminate the religious 
employee’s conflict.  The Supreme Court determined that a reasonable 
accommodation is an accommodation that “eliminates the conflict between 
[the employee’s] employment requirements and religious practices,”258 and 
the lower courts have generally refused to find an accommodation 
reasonable if it could not possibly eliminate the religious employee’s 
conflict.259  However, the lower courts have also determined that an 
accommodation with the potential to eliminate a religious employee’s 
conflict can be a reasonable accommodation even if it does not actually 
eliminate the conflict.260  For example, the courts tend to agree that a 
                                                          
 257. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.03 (West 2000) (criminalizing a “caregiver’s 
failure or omission to provide a child with the care, supervision, and services necessary to 
maintain the child’s physical and mental health, including, but not limited to, food, nutrition, 
clothing, shelter, [and] supervision . . . that a prudent person would consider essential for the 
well-being of the child”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 2000) (providing that a 
“person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when . . . [h]e knowingly acts in a 
manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than 
seventeen years old”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304 (West 1983) (providing that a 
“parent . . . commits a misdemeanor . . . if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child 
by violating a duty of care, protection, or support”). 
 258. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986). 
 259. See, e.g., United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Ilona of 
Hungary, 108 F.3d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that an employer did not reasonably 
accommodate a Jewish employee who requested time off of work for Yom Kippur by 
offering to give the employee another day off instead); Pedersen v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, 978 
F. Supp. 926, 933 (D. Neb. 1997) (finding that an employee who requested Easter Sunday 
off was not reasonably accommodated when her employer only gave her part of the day off). 
 260. See, e.g., Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1153, 1156-57 
(10th Cir. 2000) (ruling that an employer reasonably accommodated a postal employee who 
was a Sabbatarian by approving use of leave, permitting voluntary substitutes to work in the 
employee’s place, and seeking a waiver from Sabbath work from the union, even though the 
employer occasionally required the employee to work on the Sabbath); Grant v. Fairview 
Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., No. Civ. 02-4232JNEJGL, 2004 WL 326694, at *4 (D. Minn. 
Feb. 18, 2004) (concluding that there is no requirement that an accommodation entirely 
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voluntary shift swap within a neutral rotating shift system is a reasonable 
means of accommodating an employee who requests religious leave 
regardless of whether there are other employees willing to swap shifts with 
the religious employee.261 
This reasoning has been criticized by legal commentators262 and 
amendments to section 701(j) have been introduced in the House and 
Senate stating that a reasonable accommodation under section 701(j) is an 
accommodation that actually eliminates the religious employee’s 
conflict.263  A statute mandating parental accommodation in the workplace 
should clearly state that a reasonable accommodation is an accommodation 
that in fact removes the conflict between an employee’s employment 
obligation and “bona fide parenting  obligations.” 
6. Costs that an employee can be required to bear 
a. Unpaid leave 
Employees who request religious accommodation in the workplace are 
sometimes accommodated through the use of unpaid leave.264  Based upon 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ansonia, unpaid leave which allows an 
employee to observe religious holy days is a reasonable accommodation 
unless “paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious ones.”265  
The lower courts have agreed that a reasonable accommodation can require 
an employee to bear some economic costs,266 and in so determining, have 
                                                          
eliminate the employee’s conflict to be considered “reasonable” and noting that Ansonia did 
not impose such a requirement). 
 261. See, e.g., Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1088 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating 
that shift-swapping constitutes a reasonable accommodation of a religious employee, unless 
the employee believes that it is morally wrong to work on Sundays and that it is a sin to ask 
someone else to work in the employee’s place on Sunday); Moore v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 
727 F. Supp. 1156, 1160 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding that an employer reasonably 
accommodated a religious employee when it allowed the employee to make shift swaps and 
“encouraged and solicited” other employees to swap shifts with the religious employee). 
 262. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 199, at 630 (urging Congress to adopt the position 
that an accommodation is only reasonable under § 701(j) when it entirely resolves the 
employee’s religious conflict). 
 263. See, e.g., Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 1997, S. 1124, 105th Cong. 
§ 2(b)(2) (1997) (stating that “an accommodation by the employer shall not be deemed to be 
reasonable if such accommodation does not remove the conflict between employment 
requirements and the religious observance or practice of the employee”). 
 264. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986) (suggesting 
that a school board’s decision to allow an employee to use unpaid leave to observe religious 
holidays in excess of three days annually constituted a reasonable accommodation of the 
employee’s religious beliefs). 
 265. Id. at 71. 
 266. See, e.g., Pinsker v. Joint Dist. No. 28J, 735 F.2d 388, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that Title VII does not require that employers accommodate employees’ religious 
practices in a way that avoids any costs to the employee whatsoever); Vaughn v. Waffle 
House, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that an accommodation 
resulting in a reduction in salary was not unreasonable merely because it required the 
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tipped the balance of section 701(j) in favor of the employer and against the 
religious employee.267 
There are instances where employees with work-family conflicts are 
accommodated through the use of unpaid leave.  Some working parents 
specifically request time off without pay to tend to their childcare 
responsibilities, and for these employees unpaid leave would constitute a 
reasonable accommodation.268  However, there are also many parents, 
particularly those in low paying and minimum wage jobs, who simply 
cannot afford to take unpaid leave.269  For these employees, time off 
without pay would not be a reasonable accommodation.  Instead, other 
accommodations such as flextime or shift swaps should be offered.270  
Whether, and the extent to which, time off without pay constitutes a 
reasonable accommodation will be a very fact-specific determination for 
the courts. 
b. Use of vacation days 
One way that employers accommodate religious employees is by 
permitting them to take vacation days on their religious holidays.  Lower 
courts are in agreement that requiring an employee to use some vacation 
days to observe religious holy days can be a reasonable accommodation,271 
but requiring an employee to potentially use all the allotted vacation time to 
refrain from work on a religious holiday is not a reasonable 
accommodation.272  While inevitably a fact-specific determination, this 
                                                          
employee to bear some cost in observing religious holidays).  Costs to the employee are 
clearly a significant legal issue since Title VII prohibits religious discrimination with respect 
to “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (2000). 
 267. Employers, who in general have deeper pockets and are therefore better able to 
absorb the cost, are almost never required to bear an economic cost in accommodating a 
religious employee.  See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 268. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 133-44 (describing a 
working mother who used her paid vacation days to work a four-day week only after her 
employer had refused her preferred accommodation which was to work a reduced schedule 
with reduced pay). 
 269. See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 131-34 (noting that “low-income working 
parents were significantly more likely to lack both workplace flexibility and social 
supports,” often forcing them to choose between losing pay in order to care for sick children 
and leaving sick children at home). 
 270. Both flextime and paid leave have been shown to be a reasonable means of 
accommodating parents with childcare emergencies.  Id. at 58-59, 65. 
 271. See, e.g., Getz v. Pennsylvania, 802 F.2d 72, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1986) (determining that 
the plaintiff was reasonably accommodated because she was able to have her religious 
holidays off without using up most of her vacation time).   
 272. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1379 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that “[a]n employer who permits an employee to avoid mandatory Sabbath work only by 
using accrued vacation does not ‘reasonably accommodate’ the employee’s religious 
beliefs,” because the employee effectively loses a benefit which is available to other 
employees who do not have the same religious conflict). 
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would also be the appropriate balance to use in cases involving the work-
family conflict, and the literature illustrates that paid vacation days help 
working parents balance their work and family responsibilities.273 
c. Part-time employment 
One significant issue that arises in the context of parental 
accommodation in the workplace, which is not an issue in cases of religious 
accommodation, is the use of part-time employment as a means of 
accommodating employees.274  Many employees, particularly working 
mothers, may choose to work fewer hours at reduced pay so that they can 
spend additional time with their children.275  The problem is that these part-
time employees often do not receive proportionately equal compensation in 
terms of salary, benefits, and bonuses as compared to full-time 
employees.276  For example, as a result of “schedule creep,”—where an 
employee’s schedule creeps back towards full-time—many part-time 
employees work longer hours than originally agreed upon, which results in 
a lower per hour salary.277  In fact, the average hourly wage of part-time 
employees is only sixty percent of the average hourly wage of a full-time 
employee.278  Many part-time employees also receive no benefits.279  Part-
time employees are often not taken seriously by employers and suffer in 
                                                          
 273. See HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 58 (noting that only forty-two percent of parents 
were able to stay home from work when their children were sick, and more than one-half of 
those parents stated that they could stay home because their employer provided paid leave).  
Twenty-nine percent of parents who were able to stay home with an ill child used paid 
vacation days to do so.  Id. 
 274. The availability of part-time work is generally not an issue in cases of religious 
accommodation because religious employees usually do not need to significantly reduce 
their work hours.  But see Vaughn v. Waffle House, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1077, 1083 
(N.D. Tex. 2003) (determining that a Sabbatarian was reasonably accommodated when he 
was transferred to a position that required fewer hours of work but paid less). 
 275. A number of commentators have suggested that the American workweek should be 
reduced.  See Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 29, at 466-71 (advocating a thirty-five-hour 
work week in order to create “family-friendly and gender-equitable working 
arrangements”); Williams, Canaries, supra note 3, at 2230 (explaining that both men and 
women seek more balanced hours because they seek to achieve success in their careers and 
to spend more time with their children). 
 276. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 96 (discussing the differences 
in wages paid to part-time and full-time employees and noting that studies suggest that 
employers “exact a price for part-time work in terms of pay, benefits, and promotion”). 
 277. See Williams, Canaries, supra note 3, at 2224 (describing the situation of part-time 
attorneys whose schedules begin moving back towards full-time); see also HOCHSCHILD, 
THE TIME BIND, supra note 3, at 99-100 (noting that the only way that an employee can 
successfully keep a part-time schedule “without violating the unspoken rules of the 
workplace” is to effectively work full time). 
 278. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 96.  This discrepancy in 
hourly wages is in part due to the fact that part-time jobs tend to involve work that is 
traditionally performed by women where even full-time employees are poorly paid.  Id.  
However, only about one-half of this discrepancy can be explained by objective factors such 
as sex.  Id. 
 279. Cf. Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 29, at 467. 
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terms of promotional opportunities and professional advancement.280  
Negative stereotypes regarding working mothers, as well as working 
fathers who take an active caregiving role, are prevalent in the 
workplace,281 and one of the points at which this “maternal wall” 
discrimination is most likely to surface is when a working mother requests 
a flexible work schedule or part-time work.282 
Part-time employment should not constitute a reasonable 
accommodation in cases in which these problems exist.  Rather, part-time 
employment should only constitute a “reasonable accommodation” if the 
employee’s total compensation and benefits are proportionately equal to 
that of a full-time employee and the employee has meaningful 
opportunities for promotion.283 
d. Transfer of position 
Transferring a religious employee to another position, even if the 
position is less desirable, has been deemed a reasonable accommodation so 
long as the employee’s employment status is reasonably preserved.284  The 
issue of whether an employee transfer constitutes a reasonable 
accommodation in the workplace is likely to be a more prevalent issue with 
parental accommodation than with religious accommodation.  This 
difference is because most religious employees only occasionally need time 
off for religious observances, and therefore a permanent transfer to a 
position with different days or hours is usually not necessary.  In fact, it 
would only be an option for Sabbatarians, who need time off on a recurring 
weekly basis. 
On the other hand, many working parents may need to change their 
employment hours on a regular basis and one of the points at which an 
employee with caregiving obligations is likely to face discrimination is 
when she requests a modified work schedule.285  It is therefore essential 
that a statute mandating parental accommodation in the workplace clearly 
                                                          
 280. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 72-75 (discussing how part-
time employees are marginalized in the workplace). 
 281. See generally Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 90-102 (discussing 
stereotypes about employees who are family caregivers). 
 282. Id. at 78.  
 283. See generally Jacobs & Gerson, supra note 29, at 467-68 (proposing that all 
workers receive a benefits package, the extent of which would vary depending on the 
number of hours worked per week); Williams, Canaries, supra note 3, at 2233 (discussing 
how the maternal wall harms attorneys who are mothers). 
 284. See, e.g., Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (determining that 
it was a reasonable accommodation to transfer a postal inspector to a position where he 
would undergo a 90 day period where he would be without seniority); Wright v. Runyon, 2 
F.3d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding a reasonable accommodation where a Sabbatarian 
was given an opportunity to bid on other positions where he would not have to work on the 
Sabbath, even though he considered those positions less desirable). 
 285. See Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 77-78.  
KAMINER.OFFTOPRINTER 8/9/2005  1:10:24 PM 
2004] THE WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT 351 
state that a transfer to another position is only a reasonable accommodation 
if it substantially preserves an employee’s employment status. 
This subpart has examined how the federal courts have interpreted the 
“reasonable accommodation” requirement of section 701(j) and how 
“reasonable accommodation” should be interpreted with regard to parental 
accommodation in the workplace.  The next subpart addresses the “undue 
hardship” standard. 
C. Undue Hardship 
Section 701(j) requires an employer to accommodate a religious 
employee unless the employer can demonstrate that “he is unable to 
reasonably accommodate . . . an employee’s or prospective employee’s 
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of 
[his] business.”286  This subpart examines the ways in which courts have 
interpreted the term “undue hardship,” and how this term should be defined 
in a statute mandating parental accommodation in the workplace. 
In determining whether an accommodation for an employee’s religious 
needs constitutes undue hardship, the federal courts have addressed a 
number of issues which are also likely to arise with regard to parental 
accommodation in the workplace.287  For example, the lower courts have 
determined that employers are almost never required to incur economic or 
efficiency costs in accommodating a religious employee.288  Additionally, 
the courts tend to agree that hypothetical hardships do not generally 
constitute undue hardship.289  However, the courts are split on the extent to 
which an accommodation can cause undue hardship based on its impact on 
                                                          
 286. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 287. See generally Kaminer, supra note 199, at 610-22 (discussing how the lower courts 
have interpreted the term “undue hardship”). 
 288. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States W. Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1341 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (stating that an employer is not required to permit an employee to wear a button 
with a picture of an aborted fetus on it when doing so causes substantial disruption and a 
decline in productivity in the workplace); Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1380 
(6th Cir. 1994) (finding it an undue hardship to require an employer to hire an additional 
worker or risk reduced productivity in order to accommodate an employee’s inability to 
work on the Sabbath); Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that an employer was not required to excuse an employee from work every Friday for 
religious reasons since accommodation proposals involved significant economic costs). 
 289. See, e.g., Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(dismissing the employer’s concern with hypothetical hardships); Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, 
Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1492 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding liability too speculative where an 
employer refuses to hire a potential employee who uses peyote for religious purposes 
because actual harm would be eliminated by merely requiring the potential employee to 
abstain from work for twenty-four hours after each ceremonial use of the drug); Brown v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 960-61 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that the employer’s 
burden of proving an undue hardship is not met by merely stating a fear that there may be 
even greater costs if more Sabbatarians come forward and request accommodations). 
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a religious employee’s colleagues.290  These issues, and their application to 
a statute mandating parental accommodation in the workplace, will be 
discussed in this subpart. 
1. Defining undue hardship 
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,291 the United States Supreme 
Court limited an employer’s obligation to accommodate a religious 
employee by defining undue hardship as any cost greater than de 
minimis.292  Based on the holding in Hardison, lower courts have broadly 
interpreted undue hardship, thereby requiring only a minimal level of 
accommodation.  More specifically, lower courts, on a case-by-case basis, 
have consistently determined that employers are not required to incur any 
economic cost or cost in terms of lost efficiency in accommodating a 
religious employee.293  Undue hardship has been found in cases where the 
employer would have to make do without the religious employee,294 where 
accommodation would involve the complex shuffling of employees,295 
where accommodation would involve administrative costs,296 where the 
employer would essentially be permitting a part-time employee to receive 
full-time benefits,297 where accommodation would cause a decrease in 
employee productivity,298 and where the employer would have to incur the 
cost of a replacement employee.299 
                                                          
 290. See generally Kaminer, supra note 199, at 616-21 (explaining that while the Fifth 
Circuit has focused on employee complaints, the Ninth Circuit has gone a step further and 
has analyzed whether the employee complaints are valid). 
 291. 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
 292. Id. at 84.  The Hardison dissent expressed concern with this standard and “seriously 
question[ed]” whether undue hardship could be defined so broadly as to constitute any cost 
more than de minimis.  See id. at 93 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 293. See Kaminer, supra note 199, at 614 (“The courts, however, have not specifically 
articulated a rule that such accommodation always constitutes undue hardship, and have 
therefore left open the possibility that some economic or efficiency costs could be required 
of employers in future cases.”). 
 294. See, e.g., Mann v. Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1369-70 (8th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that 
requiring the employer to “just do without” the employee in need of accommodation would 
result in lost productivity). 
 295. See, id. (criticizing an employee’s proposed accommodations that would require her 
co-workers to either work overtime in her place, increase their work rotations, or otherwise 
absorb the effects of the employee’s absence). 
 296. See, e.g., Wisner v. Truck Cent., 784 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming 
the district court’s conclusion that an employer would suffer undue hardship if it 
accommodated a religious employee’s inability to work on his Sabbath). 
 297. See, e.g., Lee v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019, 1021-23 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(observing that an employee’s proposed accommodation would allow him to obtain benefits 
that he had not earned under the collective bargaining agreement); Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 
981 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that the proposed accommodation would allow an 
employee to receive  undeserved benefits). 
 298. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1380 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding it 
an undue hardship to require an employer to hire additional workers or risk reduced 
productivity in order to accommodate an employee’s inability to work on the Sabbath). 
 299. See, e.g., Lee, 22 F.3d at 1023-24 (addressing the cost of bringing in a driver from 
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The de minimis standard has been criticized by legal commentators who 
argue that it significantly limits an employer’s obligation to accommodate 
and therefore fails to adequately protect religious employees.300  The 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act,301 which has been introduced numerous 
times in both the House of Representatives and the Senate,302 would amend 
section 701(j) and define undue hardship as an accommodation “requiring 
significant difficulty or expense”303 which is the standard applied under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).304 
A statute mandating parental accommodation in the workplace should 
clearly state that undue hardship is a cost “requiring significant difficulty 
and expense” rather than any cost greater than de minimis.  There are a 
number of reasons why this ADA standard should be used.  As the section 
701(j) case law illustrates, the de minimis standard has significantly limited 
the protection given to religious employees and a stronger standard is 
therefore needed.305  In addition, federal courts tend to focus on formal 
equality and are hesitant to mandate affirmative action or differential 
treatment of employees in the workplace.306  Therefore, a statute mandating 
                                                          
another city to work on the Sabbath); Cooper, 15 F.3d at 1380 (reiterating that hiring an 
additional worker to work an entire week so that an employee can take every Saturday off is 
more than a de minimis cost); Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 
1982) (upholding the district court’s finding that hiring an additional employee imposed 
more than a de minimis cost and that using an existing employee as a substitute “resulted in 
decreased efficiency, economic loss, and increased risk to patients”). 
 300. See Kaminer, supra note 199, at 628-29 (recommending that Congress amend 
Section 701(j) so that undue hardship is defined as a meaningful and significant cost); 
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion:  An Update and a Response to the 
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 704 (1992) (suggesting that the stronger undue 
hardship standard used in evaluating accommodations for disabled persons should apply to 
religious accommodations). 
 301. See, e.g., Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003, S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003); 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2002, S. 2572, 107th Cong. (2002); Workplace 
Religious Freedom Act of 2002, H.R. 4237, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 302. Workplace Religious Freedom Act, S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003).  See also Kaminer, 
supra note 199, at 628-29 (noting that the Workplace Religious Freedom Act was 
introduced in 1994 in the House of Representatives, reintroduced in 1996 in the House and 
Senate, and has been reintroduced again in subsequent sessions of Congress).    
 303. See, e.g., Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003, S. 893, 108th Cong. § 2(a) 
(2003). 
 304. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
 305. See supra notes 291-299 and accompanying text (highlighting cases where courts 
have rejected a proposed accommodation because it imposed more than a de minimis 
burden on the employer). 
 306. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1567 (3d Cir. 1996) (agreeing that Title 
VII does not permit an employer to enact a non-remedial affirmative action policy that uses 
race as the deciding factor in an effort to promote diversity); Engel, supra note 12, at 320 
(“Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination has generally been read as requiring that 
employers apply workplace requirements and regulations ‘neutrally.’”).  But see Johnson v. 
Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 637-40 (1987) (permitting a voluntary remedial affirmative 
action plan because it addressed a manifest imbalance of women in the workforce, used 
gender as only one of a number of factors and did not trammel the rights of male 
employees). 
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parental accommodation in the workplace should be worded strongly 
enough that the courts would be limited in their ability to read it narrowly. 
Professor Smith raises a number of concerns with the “significant 
difficulty or expense” standard and instead suggests using an intermediate 
standard that would define undue hardship as an accommodation that 
imposes more than a moderate cost on an employer.307  Because more 
employees will need parental accommodation than religious 
accommodation, Professor Smith fears that the “significant difficulty or 
expense” standard would place too great a burden on employers.308  
However, as previously explained, in many instances employers can save 
money in the long term if they accommodate working parents.309  
Furthermore, in situations where accommodating the bona fide parenting 
obligations of working parents imposes costs, employers should be 
permitted to consider the total cost of accommodating all employees 
requesting accommodation, and not simply the cost of accommodating any 
one employee.  Therefore, even if there is a greater absolute number of 
employees requesting parental accommodation than the number requesting 
religious accommodation, the employer’s total cost should be no greater. 
Professor Smith also expressed concern that employees may abuse a 
parental accommodation statute.310  While this abuse may occur in some 
cases, there are many working parents who are currently hesitant to use 
flexible work policies due to negative stereotypes associated with 
employees who work a modified schedule.311  In addition, while Professor 
Smith’s intermediate standard would limit the total number of cases in 
which an employer must accommodate an employee, it would limit both 
valid requests as well as fraudulent requests for parental accommodation.  
Furthermore, as Professor Smith acknowledges, in some cases, employers 
could ask for documentation proving the employee had a valid parental 
obligation.312 
Finally Professor Smith states that a parental accommodation statute 
raises “gender segregationist concerns,” as the enactment of such a statute 
may lead employers to refuse to hire women based upon concern that 
women are most likely to ask for parental accommodation.313  This concern 
is valid, and Professor Smith wisely suggests that the government share the 
                                                          
 307. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1479-86. 
 308. Id. at 1483 (noting that forty percent of workers in the United States have children 
under the age of eighteen). 
 309. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 310. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1479-86.  
 311. See supra Part IV.B.6.c (discussing the problems associated with part-time 
employment). 
 312. See id. at 1484.  
 313. See id. at 1484-85.   
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cost of accommodation with employers.314  However, it appears 
counterproductive to advocate a statute mandating parental accommodation 
in the workplace, which in large part serves to level the playing field for 
working mothers, and then fail to draft the statute in a meaningful way for 
fear that the statute itself will cause discrimination.  Women who are 
discriminated against are also protected by Title VII. 
2. Hypothetical hardships 
In determining whether an employer will suffer an undue hardship in 
accommodating a religious employee, a recurring issue is whether 
hypothetical hardships constitute undue hardship.315  The issue of 
hypothetical hardships arises both in cases in which there may be other 
employees potentially in need of religious accommodation, as well as in 
cases where the costs of accommodating only the employee requesting the 
accommodation are speculative.316 
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the Supreme Court relied on 
hypothetical costs to Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) in determining that 
the company would suffer an undue hardship if it accommodated 
Hardison.317  In dismissing the dissent’s argument that accommodating 
Hardison would not result in more than a de minimis cost to TWA, the 
Hardison Court stated that the dissent “ignores . . . the express finding of 
the District Court . . . and it fails to take account of the likelihood that a 
company as large as TWA may have many employees whose religious 
observances, like Hardison’s, prohibit them from working on Saturdays or 
Sundays.”318 
The lower courts, however, have essentially ignored the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Hardison, and most agree that an employer must 
establish that it will suffer an actual undue hardship in accommodating a 
religious employee and that speculative or hypothetical hardships are 
insufficient.319  Some courts, however, have expressed concern with 
hypothetical hardships in cases in which a religious employee’s co-workers 
might be adversely impacted by an accommodation.320 
                                                          
 314. See id. at 1485-86 (reasoning that the government has an interest in encouraging 
parental accommodation because good parenting benefits society). 
 315. See Kaminer, supra note 199, at 611-13 (reviewing how various court of appeals 
have addressed the issue of hypothetical hardships). 
 316. Id. 
 317. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977).    
 318. Id. at 84 n.15. 
 319. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.   
 320. See Virts v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 285 F.3d 508, 517-21 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(finding that the religious employee’s proposed accommodations had the potential to 
adversely affect the seniority rights of other employees under the collective bargaining 
agreement); Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(determining it was an undue hardship to “skip over” a driver requesting religious 
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By ignoring the Hardison Court’s reasoning and by generally refusing to 
equate hypothetical hardships with undue hardship, the lower courts appear 
reluctant to interpret undue hardship in a manner that would essentially 
render section 701(j) meaningless.  As the Eighth Circuit explained, “Were 
the law otherwise, any accommodation, however slight, would rise to the 
level of an undue hardship because, if sufficiently magnified through 
predictions of the future behavior of the employee’s co-workers, even the 
minutest accommodation could be calculated to reach that level.”321 
The issue of hypothetical hardships is somewhat different with regard to 
parental accommodation in the workplace.  Equating hypothetical hardship 
with undue hardship would not necessarily render a statute mandating 
parental accommodation meaningless, because a business argument can be 
made for restructuring the workplace to more generally accommodate 
working parents.  In other words, if an employer were to accommodate a 
larger number of employees it may receive “hypothetical benefits,” instead 
of suffering “hypothetical hardships.”  These benefits are demonstrated by 
economic studies indicating that once long-term costs are taken into 
consideration, Flexible Work Arrangements (FWAs) may save employers 
money by decreasing costs associated with “attrition, absenteeism, 
recruiting, quality control, and productivity.”322  Just as the business 
argument for accommodation can be used in response to an employer’s 
business necessity defense under Title VII, it could also be used to show 
that an employer will not necessarily suffer undue hardship under a statute 
modeled on section 701(j), even if hypothetical hardships are considered. 
3. Employee complaints 
Despite the fact that section 701(j) refers to “undue hardship on the 
conduct of an employer’s business,”323 the lower courts agree that an 
employer can also demonstrate undue hardship by showing that an 
accommodation would adversely impact the religious employee’s co-
workers, such as by requiring a non-religious colleague to work the 
religious employee’s less desirable shift.324  In so determining, the lower 
courts have relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hardison in which 
the Court was clearly as concerned with the effect Hardison’s proposed 
accommodations would have on his colleagues as with the cost of these 
                                                          
accommodation because the other drivers might be sent on shorter less profitable runs and 
would have less rest and time off between runs). 
 321. Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 961 (8th Cir. 1979) (quoting Haring v. 
Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (D.D.C. 1979)). 
 322. See Williams & Segal, Maternal Wall, supra note 3, at 88; see also WILLIAMS, 
UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 88-94; supra Part II.E (discussing how employers are 
harmed by refusing to accommodate working parents). 
 323. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). 
 324. See Kaminer, supra note 199, at 617. 
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accommodations on his employer.325 
There is, however, a lack of consensus on the extent to which employee 
grumbling alone, or a decrease in employee morale regarding the religious 
employee’s accommodation, should be a factor in determining whether co-
workers have been adversely affected in a manner that constitutes undue 
hardship.326  While some courts have focused on employee complaints, 
other courts have gone a step further and have analyzed whether these 
employee complaints are, in fact, justified. 
In determining that an accommodation did not constitute undue hardship, 
the Ninth Circuit has focused on the actual burden the religious employee’s 
co-workers would suffer.  For example, the Ninth Circuit determined that a 
Sabbatarian could be accommodated at an inspection center that was open 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week without causing the employer 
undue hardship since the plaintiff was willing to work an equal number of 
undesirable shifts in exchange for his Sabbath off.327  Refusing to rely on 
employee complaints, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[e]ven proof that 
employees would grumble about a particular accommodation is not enough 
to establish undue hardship.”328  In a different case, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that an employer of a “Christian, faith-operated business” 
would not suffer undue hardship in permitting an employee who was an 
atheist to be excused from mandatory devotional services.  The court 
explained that a claim of undue hardship must “be supported by proof of 
actual imposition on coworkers or disruption of the work routine.”329 
The Fifth Circuit, however, has placed more emphasis on the complaints 
of other employees and decreased employee morale.  In Brener v. 
Diagnostic Center Hospital,330 a hospital pharmacist refused to work on his 
                                                          
 325. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977). 
 326. Professor Smith concludes that employers may not deny the preferences of a 
religious employee’s colleagues when accommodating the religious employee and supports 
this statement by citing Eversley v. Mbank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1988).  Smith, 
supra note 3, at 1498-99.  While the author agrees that the Fifth Circuit has relied heavily on 
employee complaints in determining whether an employer will suffer an undue hardship, the 
author disagrees with Professor’s Smith conclusion that the lower courts have reached a 
consensus on this issue.   
 327. Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1472 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 328. Id. at 1473 (quoting Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 
397, 402 (9th Cir. 1978)); see also Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 607 (9th 
Cir.) (finding that an employer does not suffer undue hardship “merely because the 
[religious] employee’s co-workers find his conduct irritating or unwelcome”).  However, an 
employer will suffer undue hardship if the religious employee engages in behavior that 
would “demean or degrade” his co-workers.  Id. at 608. 
 329. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. 
Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also Bynum v. Fort Worth 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 41 F. Supp. 2d 641, 556 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (indicating that the plaintiff’s 
colleagues were justified in their resentment of taking on the plaintiff’s duties). 
 330. 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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religious holidays.331  The Fifth Circuit agreed with the hospital that 
requiring other employees to trade shifts with the religious employee would 
cause undue hardship despite the fact that the religious employee was 
willing to work undesirable shifts in return for his holidays off and, 
therefore, the actual imposition on Brener’s co-workers of a shift swap 
would have been extremely minimal.332  Two years later, the Fifth Circuit 
again emphasized the importance of employee complaints, determining that 
an employer was under no obligation to even pursue a voluntary swap for a 
religious employee.333 
Employee complaints and grumbling are a growing issue with regard to 
parental accommodation in the workplace.  In recent years childless, or 
“childfree,” employees have become increasingly vocal in their opposition 
to family friendly policies which they believe discriminate against 
employees without children.334  This resentment is evident in the title of 
Elinor Burkett’s book, The Baby Boon:  How Family Friendly America 
Cheats the Childless.335  As Burkett explains, many childfree employees 
feel that they are often stuck working additional hours to cover for their 
colleagues with childcare obligations, and that they are more likely to work 
less desirable weekend and holiday shifts.336  The question then becomes at 
what point this type of “employee grumbling” rises to the level of 
constituting an undue hardship. 
The Ninth Circuit has taken the correct approach by focusing on the 
“actual burden” that the accommodated employee’s colleagues will suffer 
and not focusing simply on co-worker complaints.337  The problem with the 
Fifth Circuit’s approach is that if employee complaints alone are enough to 
constitute undue hardship, a few vocal employees would be able to stop 
                                                          
 331. Id. at 143-44. 
 332. Id. at 146-47. 
 333. See Turpen v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1027 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(reasoning that the employer believed other employees’ complaints regarding such a job 
swap would make it impossible). 
 334. See generally BURKETT, supra note 39, at 25-61 (highlighting the resentment 
childfree employees harbor because they feel employees with children receive special 
benefits); Arnow-Richman, supra note 3, at 392 (asserting that the perception that parental 
accommodation provides special benefits to employees with children is similar to the 
backlash against affirmative action policies); Smith, supra note 3, at 1486-91 (raising 
concerns from employees without children who feel they must take on an unequal share of 
work to accommodate employees with children). 
 335. BURKETT, supra note 39. 
 336. See id. at 40. 
[A]s the breeder’s rugrats have been growing these years, more and more breeders 
have been whining that they need to work such and such hours to pick Johnny up 
from daycare or to drop Susie off at school, etc, etc.  Over the ten years that I have 
worked at this hospital, my schedule has been adjusted to fit the needs of the 
breeders, which I think is totally discriminatory.   
Id. 
 337. See supra notes 327-329 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit cases). 
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parental accommodation in the workplace.  Therefore, any statute 
mandating parental accommodation in the workplace should follow the 
Ninth Circuit approach. 
At the same time, employers should be obligated to minimize both the 
actual burden on the accommodated employees’ colleagues as well as any 
inaccurate perception of inequity, which could lead to workplace 
resentment.  Part of the hostility that childless employees have towards 
flexible work policies is caused by employers who permit some employees 
to work part-time and then “dump the excess work on existing employees 
but pay them no additional compensation for doing it.”338  It is 
understandable why colleagues of accommodated employees feel resentful 
when they are the ones bearing the cost of the accommodation.  In addition, 
to lessen resentment, employees should be informed of the business 
argument for flexible work arrangements and should also clearly be 
informed that employees who work shorter hours in fact receive less 
compensation.339  Finally, there are also many employees without bona fide 
parenting obligations who, for a variety of reasons, want increased 
workplace flexibility and in many cases it would make business sense for 
employers to accommodate these employees as well. 
This subpart has examined how the courts have interpreted the “undue 
hardship” requirement of section 701(j), and how this requirement should 
be interpreted in a statute mandating parental accommodation in the 
workplace.  As explained, “undue hardship” should be defined as a cost 
requiring “significant difficulty or expense” and not as any cost greater 
than “de minimis.”  Due to the long term cost savings that are likely to be 
associated with a restructured workplace, hypothetical hardships will most 
likely not be a major issue with regard to parental accommodation in the 
workplace.  However, undue hardship may be found in cases where 
accommodation of working parents has a significant adverse impact on the 
working parents’ colleagues. 
CONCLUSION 
Many working mothers and fathers regularly encounter difficulty 
balancing their work and parenting responsibilities.  Federal law has failed 
to adequately protect working parents, and many employers do not provide 
sufficient flexibility for their employees who are juggling childcare and 
work obligations.  This failure of employers to accommodate working 
parents has proven harmful to women, men, children, society, and even to 
                                                          
 338. See Williams, Difference, supra note 32, at 1450.  
 339. See Williams, Canaries, supra note 3, at 2236-38 (underscoring how a flexible 
work arrangement cannot succeed if company culture is not amenable to it). 
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employers themselves.  Federal legislation should therefore be enacted to 
address this problem and mandate meaningful accommodation of working 
parents. 
As this Article has explained, the balancing approach of section 701(j) 
should be adopted, and employers should be required to “reasonably 
accommodate” working parents’ bona fide parenting obligations in cases 
where accommodation will not cause “undue hardship” to the employer.  
This balancing approach will provide increased flexibility for working 
parents, while ensuring that any cost to employers is not overly 
burdensome.  Although parental accommodation in the work place cannot 
resolve the work-family conflict on its own,340 it is nonetheless a crucial 
step in ensuring that working parents are not forced to choose between their 
jobs and caring for their children. 
                                                          
 340. Other steps that the government should take include increasing access to affordable 
quality childcare and after school programs, scheduling longer school days and a longer 
school year that better matches the work day of the American labor force, and improving 
public transportation.  HEYMANN, supra note 1, at 181-90. 
